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Abstract
"Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics" consists of three papers concerned with
ontological issues in the foundations of mathematics. Chapter 1, "Numbers and Persons,"
confronts the problem of the inscrutability of numerical reference and argues that, even if
inscrutable, the reference of the numerals, as we ordinarily use them, is determined much
more, precisely than up to isomorphism. We argue that the truth conditions of a variety
of numerical modal and counterfactual sentences (whose acceptance plays a crucial role in
applications) place serious constraints on the sorts of items to which numerals, as we ordi-
narily use them, can be taken to refer: Numerals cannot be taken to refer to objects that
exist contingently such as people, mountains, or rivers, but rather must be taken to refer
to objects that exist necessarily such as abstracta.
Chapter 2, "Modern Set Theory and Replacement," takes up a challenge to explain the
reasons one should accept the axiom of replacement of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, when
its applications within ordinary mathematics and the rest of science are often described
as rare and recondite. We argue that this is not a question one should be interested in;
replacement is required to ensure that the element-set relation is well-founded as well as
to ensure that the cumulation of sets described by set theory reaches and proceeds beyond
the level w of the cumulative hierarchy. A more interesting question is whether we should
accept instances of replacement on uncountable sets, for these are indeed rarely used outside
higher set theory. We argue that the best case for (uncountable) replacement comes not
from direct, intuitive considerations, but from the role replacement plays in the formulation
of transfinite recursion and the theory of ordinals, and from the fact that it permits us
to express and assert the (first-order) content of the modern cumulative view of the set-
theoretic universe as arrayed in a cumulative hierarchy of levels.
Chapter 3, "A No-Class Theory of Classes," makes use of the apparatus of plural quan-
tification to construe talk of classes as plural talk about sets, and thus provide an inter-
pretation of both one- and two-sorted versions of first-order Morse-Kelley set theory, an
impredicative theory of classes. We argue that the plural interpretation of impredicative
theories of classes has a number of advantages over more traditional interpretations of the
language of classes as involving singular reference to gigantic set-like entities, only too
encompassing to be sets, the most important of these being perhaps that it makes the ma-
3chinery of classes available for the formalization of much recent and very interesting work
in set theory without threatening the universality of the theory as the most comprehensive
theory of collections, when these are understood as objects.
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Chapter 1
Numbers and Persons
1.1 Introduction: The Problem
As reference is ordinarily conceived, in order for a term to refer, there must be some combi-
nation of intentions, central features of usage, and relevant non-linguistic facts that connect
specific uses of the term with its referent. Provided that numerals refer, then, there must be
some combination of intentions and central features of use of the numerals either in theory
or in applications, which, in conjunction with relevant non-linguistic facts, such as the facts
of arithmetic, connect specific uses of the numerals with their referents, the numbers.
A very simple permutation argument establishes, it seems to me, that, provided again
that numerals refer, this is hopeless as a picture of numerical reference. If n is a permu-
tation of the natural numbers, then a reinterpretation of the arithmetical vocabulary that
takes the usual numeral for each number n to refer not to n itself but to ir(n) and makes
compensatory changes in the interpretation of each arithmetical predicate will be indis-
tinguishable from the original interpretation with respect to the truth values they assign
to each numerical sentence. Tob illustrate this point, notice that one could exchange the
referents of the numerals '4' and '5', provided only that obvious compensatory changes are
made in the interpretation of each arithmetical predicate. For example, a predicate such
as "is a successor of" would be reinterpreted to refer to a relation which is like the suc-
cessor relation except for the fact that 5 bears that relation to 4 but not the reverse, and
a functional expression such as "the cardinal number of" would be reinterpreted to refer
7
CHAPTER 1. NUMBERS AND PERSONS
to a function that assigns the number 5 to sets which contain exactly 4 members and the
number 4 to sets which contain exactly 5 members.
Perhaps it will be replied that it is our intention to use the numeral '4' to refer to the
number 4, and not to the number 5, that excludes the possibility of a perverse reinter-
pretation of the numerals of the sort we have jusL envisaged. But all the reply does is to
postpone the problem; in order for us to intend the number 4, and not the number 5, to
be the referent of a numeral, there must be some combination of mental factors and other
relevant facts, such as the facts of arithmetic, that permit us to discern one from the other.
But, unless mental states are individuated in terms of their objects, a minor variation on the
permutation argument just given would seem to suggest that the mental states of someone
with an intention to refer to the number 4 would be qualitatively indistinguishable in all
the relevant respects from the mental states of someone with an intention to refer to the
number onto which the number 4 is permuted, the number 5.
I think we should admit that the moral of the permutation argument is that, provided
that numerals refer, there is no combination of intentions, central features of usage, and
non-linguistic facts that may be used to discern one interpretation of the numerals from a
variety of alternative interpretations that differ from it in the natural numbers they assign
to some numerals. There are reasons to be concerned. A paradox immediately confronts us:
For, even after we realize that the reference of the numeral '4' is inscrutable, what could be
more evident that, provided that the number 4 exists, the numeral '4' refers in the language
we actually speak to the number 4 and to nothing else? A solution to the paradox might be
to treat reference disquotationally, regarding sentences such as "If 4 exists, then '4' refers
in the language we actually speak to 4 and to nothing else" as analytic. Such a solution
would perhaps help us to salvage the intuition that, provided that the number 4 exists, the
numeral '4' refers in the language we actually speak to the number 4 and to nothing else,
but it would certainly sever the tie between reference and the activities of speakers.' Be
that as it may, it is not my intention in this chapter to confront this paradox, but rather to
discuss another question that emerges with the inscrutability of numerical reference.
' The disquotational line of response to the inscrutability of mathematical reference is briefly discussed
by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1993), 103-109.
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Another, perhaps more serious difficulty that emerges with the inscrutability of numer-
ical reference is due to the fact that the standard Tarskian semantics explains the truth
conditions of complete sentences in terms of reference and satisfaction. Now: if numerals do
not refer, then it surely will not be possible to explain the truth of va sentence like "4 < 5"
in terms of reference and satisfaction.
This need not be an insurmountable problem, but it requires the development of an
alternative explanation of the truth conditions of numerical sentences in terms other than
reference and satisfaction. To develop a perfectly general alternative to the Tarskian account
would, no doubt, be a task of staggering difficulty, but, fortunately, the numerical case
is considerably simpler than the general case. Thus, when attention is restricted to the
numerical case, it is not difficult to develop an alternative, attractive account of truth that
explains the truth conditions of arithmetical, and other numerical sentences, without appeal
to determinate reference. Provided that some combination of intentions, central, non-
negotiable features of utsage, and relevant, non-linguistic facts selects a class of candidate
reference relations for the entire class of numerals given by isomorphic copies of the natural
number system, we can take the entire sequence of numerals to co-vary over all the candidate
referents, and count a numerical sentence true just in case the sentence is true on all the
candidate interpretations. 2
What are the candidate referents for the numerals? To settle this question is to discern
the limits of the inscrutability of numerical reference, and that is precisely the aim of this
chapter. Perhaps there is no combination of intentions, features of use of the numerals either
in theory or in applications, and other relevant facts that connect them uniquely with their
referents, but the question remains whether they are able to at least exclude certain items as
candidates to be the referents of the numerals. After all, for all the permutation argument
implies, the scope of the inscrutability of numerical reference may well be restricted to the
domain of natural numbers.
Or is it? Are items of an ostensibly different sort from numbers candidates to be the
2This is no trivial assumption, but it is nonetheless one that I will take for granted for present purposes;
I will assume, in particular, that we manage to select a class of models, given by isomorphic copies of the
natural number system, candidate reference relations for the entire class of numerals.
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referents of the numerals? Are sets candidate referents for the numerals, as ordinarily used
in theory and in applications? Is the unit set of the number 3 a candidate referent for
the numeral '4'? Are symbols candidate referents for the numerals as used in theory and
applications? Is the Arabic numeral '4' a candidate referent for the numeral '4'?
Or are ordinary objects candidate referents for the numerals? Is, to vary an example
from Richard Cartwright, 3 Mo Vaughn, the man who used to play first base for the 1998
Boston Red Sox, a candidate referent for the numeral '4', as ordinarily used in theory and
in applications? Presumably not, for, if the numeral '4' referred to Mo Vaughn, then, by
semantic descent, we could infer that the number 4 is identical with Mo Vaughn, and that
is a rather extravagant claim to make.
There is a deservedly famous argument due to Paul Benacerraf that is often taken to
broaden the scope of the inscrutability to a wide range of items other than natural numbers.4
Benacerraf called attention to a problem that emerges in the context of ontological reduc-
tion. It is ordinarily assumed that mathematics, and, in particular, number theory reduces
to set theory. This reduction proceeds via the identification of the natural numbers with
specific sets, but, as Benacerraf reminded us, several methods can be used to that end.
What are perhaps the two most common methods for reducing number theory to set theory
are due to Ernst Zermelo, who identified each natural number with the singleton of its
predecessor, and to John von Neumann, who identified each natural number with the set
of its predecessors. Now: Benacerraf's crucial observation is that both plans seem to serve
the purpose of the reduction equally well: no amount of reflection on our central uses of
the arithmetical vocabulary either in theory or in applications or on the facts of arithmetic
would seem to settle the question of whether numerals refer to finite Zermelo ordinals rather
than with to Neumann's finite ordinals.
Benacerraf observed further that, in general, no amount of reflection on central uses
of the arithmetical vocabulary in theory and in applications or on the facts of arithmetic
appears to settle the question whether numerals refer to the members of one rather than
3In the Addenda to "Propositions" in (Cartwright, 1987, 52).
4Cf. (Benacerraf, 1965).
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another isomorphic copy of the natural number system, regardless of their sort.5 The
conclusion suggests itself that the reference of the numerals is determined no more precisely
than up to isomorphism.
This conclusion - that the reference of the numerals is determined no more precisely
than up to isomorphism - may have been one Benacerraf's line of argument warranted, but
it was certainly not the conclusion he extracted. Benacerraf never presented his argument
as an argument for the inscrutability of numerical reference. Nor did he even subscribe to
the thesis that the reference of the numerals is determined no more precisely than up to
isomorphism; in 1965, he insisted that only isomorphic copies of the natural number system
in which the relation "is less than" is recursive are candidates to play the role of the natural
number system.6 Instead, he concluded that, if numerals do not refer, then "if the truth be
known, there are no such things as numbers; which is not to say that there are not at least
two prime numbers between 15 and 17."
Whatever Benacerraf's conclusion may have been, a variety of authors have extracted the
conclusion that numerical reference is determined no more precisely than up to isomorphism,
and the interest of this thesis is that, when combined with the alternative account of truth
conditions outlined before, it provides us with a quite attractive explanation of the truth
conditions of numerical sentences: a sentence of arithmetic, for example, is true if and only
if it is true in every isomorphic copy of the natural number system, or, equivalently, if and
only if it is true in some isomorphic copy of the natural number system.
Of course it is an immediate consequence of the thesis that the reference of the numerals
is determined no more precisely than up to isomorphism that Mo Vaughn is a perfectly
suitable candidate to be the interpretation of the numeral '4'. For there are, after all,
isomorphic copies of the natural number system in which the numeral '4' refers to Mo
Vaughn. This fact, in combination with the account of truth conditions just now given,
would seem to commit us, for example, with the rather extravagant claim that a sentence
such as "The number 4 has recently moved to California" is not false.
"An isomorphic copy of the natural number system is an infinite sequence of objects each one of which
has only finitely many predecessors.
"He has recently recanted in (Benacerraf, 1996).
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What I would like to do in this chapter is to argue that the conclusion that Mo Vaughn
is a candidate to be the referent of the numeral '4' is not only extravagant, it is false,
too. There are central features of use of the numerical terms in applications that constrain
the sorts of items to which we may take the numerals to refer; these features exclude,
in particular, ordinary objects like people, mountains, or rivers as candidates to be the
referents of the numerals. Therefore, though hopelessly inscrutable, the reference of the
numerical terms is, I want to argue, certainly determined much more precisely than up to
isomorphism.
There are at least two important reasons this thesis is of interest.
The first reason is peculiar to the philosophy of mathematics. One way to avoid the
unsavory consequences of Platonism is to adopt a stance of Aristotelian realism, according
to which mathematical objects are ordinary objects considered from an abstract point of
view.' For Aristotle, geometrical objects were ordinary objects examined from an abstract
point of view that ignored all aspects of them other than their size, shape and position. As
attractive as the Aristotelian view may seem for elementary geometry, it must be admitted
that it is not a tenable view to entertain with respect to contemporary mathematics. For
one reason, it would seem thoroughly unreasonable to expect us to encounter in physical
experience the bewildering variety of structures studied by contemporary set theory. This,
however, is no reason to reject the Aristotelian stance with respect to arithmetic, according
to which numbers are best viewed as ordinary objects considered from an abstract point of
view, a point of view that ignores all aspects of them other than their position in a certain
structure, the natural number system. But if there are limits on the inscrutability of
numerical reference and ordinary objects turn out not to be candidates to be the referents
of the numerals and other numerical terms, then the Aristotelian view with respect to
arithmetic will no longer be tenable.
The second reason is much more general and concerns the theory of reference. There
are a variety of arguments in the literature designed to establish that the inscrutability of
reference is a perfectly general phenomenon, and not one restricted to the numerical case.
7Cf. Metaphysics, M.
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The issue remains highly controversial, but Hilary Putnam has advanced a permutation
argument, which, if correct, would even seem to establish that, whatever the subject mat-
ter, reference is never determined more precisely than up to isomorphism. 8 The point of
Putnam's permutation argument is to establish that the truth conditions of complete sen-
tences determine the reference of the terms and predicates of the language no more precisely
than up to isomorphism. Since, for some philosophers, truth conditions are all there is to
determine reference, they conclude that, in the end, reference is never determined more
precisely than up to isomorphism. The thesis that, whatever the subject matter, reference
is determined no more precisely than up to isomorphism remains highly controversial. For
it is at least arguable that, in the case of ordinary reference, there are factors other than
usage or truth conditions of complete sentences that constrain the reference of most of the
tcrms we use; there are for example demonstrative identifications and causal connections
that may constrain the reference of our terms and predicates.
The interest of the numerical case is that it is arguable that there are no factors -
causal, demonstrative, or otherwise - other than truth conditions of complete sentences
that can be cited to mitigate the extent of the inscrutability, and it would seem to present
us with an unadorned case of a subject matter for which reference is determined no more
precisely than up to isomorphism.
What I would like to suggest is that reflection on the considerably simpler case of
numerical reference may throw light upon the general case, too. For, after all, if - and
this is what we shall try to establish - numerical reference is determined more precisely
than up to isomorphism, this will certainly be not due to the existence of demonstrative
identifications or other causal factors which happen to help connect the numerals uniquely
with their referents. Thus, it is at least conceivable that whatever constrains the reach of
the inscrutability of numerical reference may well place constraints on the scope of ordinary
reference, if there is such a perfectly general phenomenon, too.
8Cf. (Putnam, 1981). Davidson makes use of a similar permutation argument in (Davidson, 1979).
Another example is Quine's argument from proxy functions. To the best of my knowledge, the first use of
a permutation argument to draw a perfectly general point about reference is due to Richard Jeffrey who
exchanged people with their social security numbers in (Jeffrey, 1964). I am grateful to Vann McGee for
telling me of this reference.
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1.2 The scope of the inscrutability of numerical reference
In the end, the suggestion I will want to make is that there are features of our use of the
numerals in applications in modal and counterfactual contexts that exclude interpretations
that assign to the numerals objects that exist contingently, such as Mo Vaughn.
To see this clearly, however, we need to review first what is nowadays a familiar distin;-
tion. Compare the two different uses of the numeral '4' in the sentences:
(1) Jupiter has exactly 4 major moons,
and
(2) T' number of Jupiter's major moons is 4.9
In (1), the numeral '4' acts as an adjective, not as a substantive, and, given the usual
recursive definition of the numerical quantifiers,' 0 (1) is often paraphrased into the language
of first-order logic with identity as:
(1.a) 34X (x is a major moon of Jupiter),
which can be unpacked as:
(1.b) 3x13223x33x4( A zx $ xjA Vy(y is a major moon of Jupiter + V y = xi))
1<i<j<4 I<i<4
In contrast with its occurrence in (1), the occurrence of the numeral '4' in (2) is referential;
it refers to an object, the number 4. The truth value of (2) depends both on the existence
of a particular number, the number 4, and on whether 4 is indeed the number of Jupiter's
major moons.
9 This is one of Frege's examples in (Frege, 1884), section 55. Frege held that numbers are objects and
that "statements of number" like (1) had to be analyzed in terms of (2).
'oThe definition of the numerically definite quantifiers 'There is exactly 1', 'There is exactly 2', and the
like is:
3ox Fz - Vzr-Fz,
3.+1z Fz t+ By(Fy A 3B (Fz A X $ y)).
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In a recent paper, Neil Tennant, (Tennant, 1997), calls attention to the distinction
just now drawn with a view to establishing the necessary existence of numbers. Tennant
contends that the connection between (1) and (2) is that of analytic equivalence. Then of
course, the analyticity of certain instances of:
(3) The number of F's = 0 ++ Vx -Fx
(4) The number of F's = 1 + 3xVy (Fy ++ x = y)
(5) The number of F's = 2 + +32 132 (x 1  x2 A Vy (FyI -+ 51 = V X2 = ))
would seem to provide us with straightforward enough arguments for the (necessary) exis-
tence of the numbers 0, 1, and 2. To establish the existence of the number 0, one needs
only note that Vx --(x x). For this, coupled with the relevant instance of (3), implies
that the number of things that are not self-identical is 0. In like manner, one obtains the
existence of the number en F is instantiated with the predicate (x = 0) in (4), and
the existence of the nuni , when F is instantiated with (x = 0 V x = 1) in (5). It should
now be straightforward how to extend this line of argument to establish the existence of all
the rest of natural numbers.11
It might appear that the line of argument just now outlined supplies us with an argument
for the thesis that, as they are ordinarily used in applications, numerals cannot be taken to
refer to persons and other contingent existents. If numbers are necessary existents, then,
by semantic ascent, numerals cannot be taken to refer to contingent existents, which is the
conclusion we wanted. Unfortunately, there are reasons to be dissatisfied.
Two difficulties deserve special mention.
First, it is doubtful that all biconditionals of the form of (3), (4), and (5) are analytic.
The first point to be noticed is that, unless suitable restrictions are placed on the sorts of
predicates with which F can be instantiated, it will be possible to produce biconditionals of
the form of (5), for example, which are not only not analytic, but plainly false. For example,
"If the argument appears familiar, it is. The argument is modeled after Frege's proof in the Foundations
that the number 0 exists and that every number has a successor. I should notice, however, that, as Tennant
outlines his argument in (Tennant, 1997), it relies only on (3) and on two other principles concerning the
existence of successors.
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to employ a Fregean example, suppose we instantiate F in the relevant biconditional with
the predicate 'drew the king's carriage':
(6) The number of horses that drew the king's carriage = 4 ++
3x1 3x23x 32: 4 ( A xi : xj A Vy(y is a horse that drew the king's carriage ++1<<•j<4
v = Xi))
1<i<4
On the face of it, (6) is ambiguous between a distributive and a perhaps more salient,
collective reading of the predicate "drew the king's carriage". Now, contrary to what Frege
himself may have intimated in the Foundations, it may be true, for example, that the
number of horses that drew the king's carriage is 4, but nevertheless true of no horse that it
drew the king's carriage.12 If so, then, on a collective interpretation of the predicate "drew
the king's cer-riage," the conditional from left-to-right of (6) is not just not analytic, it is
outright false.
But even if suitable restrictions are placed on the sorts of predicates with which F can
be instantiated, one may still seriously doubt, for example, that the conditional from right-
to-left of (3), which states that if there are no F's then there is such an object as the number
0, is analytic. And the reason is that, like many others, one may subscribe to the traditional
picture of analytic truths as truths that lack content and make no substantive claims or
commitments about the way the world is; and, in particular, as truths that don't entail
the existence of particular objects. Indeed, not only do the relevant conditionals entail the
existence of objects, by Frege's argument in the Foundations, they deliver the existence
of an infinite number of objects as a consequence, which an added source of concern for
someone who subscribes to the traditional picture of analyticity.
It will perhaps be replied that the Frege-Tennant strategy can be sustained in the
presence of a weaker assumption, such as, for example, the assumption that biconditionals
of the form of (3), (4) and (5) are necessary truths (just not analytic.) Perhaps so, but
I, for one, know of no direct argument for the necessity of those biconditionals. And thus
deriving the necessary existence of numbers from the necessity of biconditionals of the form
12(Cf. Frege, 1884, section 46). I am grateful to Richard Cartwright for calling this reference to my
attention.
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of (3), (4) and (5) would be no better than deriving the necessary existence of numbers
directly from the necessity of the Peano postulates. For, after all, what warrant we have
for confidence that the axioms of arithmetic are necessary truths? Presumably, if there
is a possible world in which there are no numbers, then the axioms of arithmetic are not
necessary truths.
The second reason to be dissatisfied with Tennant's line of argument concerns the scope
of the conclusion it warrants. It seems to me that Tennant's argument establishes its
conclusion on the assumption that numerals are to be viewed as rigid designators, as terms
which cannot be taken to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. But notice
that the possibility that '4' refers to different objects in different possible worlds is not
completely outrageous. As Russell conceived of the number 4, it consisted of the class of all
sets containing exactly 4 members. If, as it is commonly assumed, a set can exist only in
those possible worlds in which their members exist, then, on the Frege-Russell account of
number, the numeral '4' refers to different classes in different possible worlds. Whereas, in
the actual world, the class of 4-membered sets contains sets containing Mo Vaughn as an
element, in other possible worlds in which Mo Vaughn doesn't exist, the class of 4-membered
sets doesn't contain any set containing Mo Vaughn as a member.
Therefore, unless it is assumed that numerals are indeed genuine names, and hence rigid
designators, the argument given by Tennant doesn't by itself establish that numbers are
objects that exist necessarily, and hence that they are different from persons and other
ordinary physical objects.
No matter, I think that there is another perfectly general line of argument for the
conclusion that numerals cannot be taken to refer to contingent existents. The argument
proceeds from the observation that it is an important, non-negotiable feature of our use
of the numerals in elementary cardinal applications that, in general, when we count, it is
enough for us to be entitled to assertion that the (cardinal) number of F's is n that there
be exactly n F's. For example, when we count Jupiter's major moons, we assert that the
number of Jupiter's major moons is 4 merely on the grounds that there are exactly 4 major
moons in Jupiter's orbit.
It is not just that we incline - for whatever accident of psychology - to make the
17
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inference from "There are exactly n F's" to "The number of F's is n," but rather that this
pattern of inference plays a crucial role in certain contexts of application. One reason for
this concerns the expressive gains substantival uses of the numerals - as exemplified in (2)
- provides to us. For example, it is the use of the numerals as substantives that permit us
to represent the fact that the ratio of F's to C's is 4 in finite compass. The adjectival use of
the numerals as adjectives provides us, at most, with the resources necessary to express that
fact as an infinite disjunction of sentences like: "There is exactly 1 F and 4 G's," "There
are exactly 2 F's and 8 G's," and the like, but certainly not those necessary to represent
the fact that the ratio of F's to G's is 4 in finite compass.
The other reason it is important to us to be able to pass from instances of "There are
exactly n F's" to instances of "The number of F's is n" is that it is this pattern of inference
that makes the facts of arithmetic relevant for deductive purposes. It is such an inference
that allows us to make use of the fact that 4 times 4 is 16 to conclude that the ratio of F's
to G's is 4 in the case in which there are exactly 4 F's and 16 G's.
A word of caution is in order. I think it is important to distinguish the observation that,
in general, we make the inference from "There are exactly n F's" to "The number of F's is
n" from the claim that biconditionals of the form of (3), (4), and (5) are necessary truths,
which would allow us to use a Frege-Tennant style of argument to conclude the necessary
existence of numbers. The observation just made concerns a central trait of our practices
in the use of the numerals in elementary cardinal applications, but remains neutral as to
whether, for example, all instances of (3), (4), and (5) are, in fact, true. Admittedly, we are
all inclined to think they are true, but, by itself, our disposition to assent to them doesn't
quite make them true.
Nor is the observation under discussion supposed to refute the viability of nominalist
projects aimed to encode much of what we achieve with the help of substantival uses of
the numerals in more metaphysically benign terms; it is not my business here to refute the
possibility that such a project can ever succeed to accomplish its aim. To repeat, the aim
of this chapter is not to argue that ordinary usage can, in the end, be sustained, or perhaps
recast in more metaphysically benign terms, but rather to discern what it takes for our
central practices in the use of the numerals to be sustained. And, in particular, what are
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the constraints these central uses of the numerals place on the sorts of items to which we
may take the numerals to refer.
To continue, then, numerals are used substantivally not only to describe actual circum-
stances, but to describe counterfactual circumstances, too; just as the sentence "The number
of Jupiter's moons is 4" is used to describe the actual circumstance in which Jupiter has
exactly 4 major moons, we can use a similar sentence to describe a counterfactual circum-
stance in which Jupiter has exactly 3 major major moons. In particular, we can describe a
counterfactual circumstance in which Jupiter has exactly 3 major moons as a circumstance
in which the number of Jupiter's major moons would have been 3. And, in general, a
counterfactual circumstance in which there are exactly n F's as a circumstance in which
the number of F's would have been n.
It is important to note that this is again not a dispensable feature of our use of the
numerals in applications; again, it is not just that we are inclined to conceive of two different
ways of describing certain counterfactual circumstances as interchangeable. Quite often, it
is precisely the ability to pass from instances of "There are n F's" to instances of "The
number of F's is n" in counterfactual contexts that allows us to reason about what would
be the case in some counterfactual circumstance or another.
Now: on the assumption that numerals are rigid designators in that they do not refer to
different objects in different possible worlds, it is not difficult to realize that a large number
of inferences from "There are exactly n F's" to "The number of F's is n" in counterfactual
contexts could not be sustained if they referred to objects that existed contingently.
Let me explain this point carefully. Unlike Jupiter, the planet Uranus has exactly 5
major moons: Ariel, Miranda, Oberon, Titania, and Umbriel. Since we could certainly
use the numeral '4' to describe a counterfactual circumstance in which there are exactly 4
major moons of Uranus as a circumstance in which the number of Uranus' major moons is
4, there are serious constraints on the sorts of objects to which we may take the numeral '4'
to refer. For example, the numeral '4' cannot refer to Ariel, one of Uranus' major moons.
The reason is that if Ariel had not existed, Uranus would have had exactly 4 major moons,
and thus our practices in ascriptions of number in counterfactual circumstances sanctions
the assertion:
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(7) If Ariel had not existed, the number of Uranus' major moons would have been 4.
But, from (7), we can infer:
(8) The number 4 would have existed, even if Ariel had not existed.
Therefore,
(9) 0 (4 $ Ariel),
which, coupled with the principle of necessity of identity:
(NI) VxVy (x = y O(x = y)),
modulo the assumption that the numeral '4' is rigid, delivers:
(10) 4 $ Ariel.
which is of course the conclusion that we wanted.
Thus far this is no better than Tennant's argument, for it, too, rests upon the assumption
that numerals cannot be interpreted to refer to different objects in different possible worlds.
The difference, however, is that there is a variation on the argument from (7) to (10) that
dispenses with the assumption that the numerals are rigid in that they cannot be taken
to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. For notice that it is not just that
the inference from "Jupiter has 4 major moons, and it would have still had 4 major moons
even if Mo Vaughn had not existed" to: "The number of Jupiter's major moons is 4, and
4 would have been the number of Jupiter's moons even if Mo Vaughn had not existed" is
important to us, in general, we regard ourselves as entitled to the claim that, whatever the
number of Jupiter's moons, it would have numbered Jupiter's moons even if Mo Vaughn
had not existed. But now, from the premise:
(11) There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which would
have been the number of Jupiter's moons even if Mo Vaughn had not existed,
we can infer:
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(12) There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which would
have existed even if Mo Vaughn had not existed.
Therefore,
(13) There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which might
have been different from Mo Vaughn,
which, again, coupled with the necessity of identity, (NI), yields:
(14) There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which is
different from Mo Vaughn.
The crucial observation now is that the truth of both (14) and the sentence "The nmimber
of Jupiter's moons is 4" are jointly incompatible with the assumption that the numeral '4'
refers to Mo Vaughn, which, once again, is the conclusion we wanted.
It should now be evident that parallel arguments establish that the numeral 4 doesn't
refer to other contingent existents such as Jupiter's moon Europa or to the river Charles.
Indeed, if no contingent existent is the referent of the numeral '4', then the numeral '4'
must refer to a necessary existent. And there is nothing special about the numeral '4': it is
not difficult to come up with analogous arguments for the conclusion that the numeral '3'
doesn't refer to objects that exist contingently such as Mo Vaughn, Europa, or King Juan
Carlos. And if we can show that no contingent existent is the referent of the numeral '3',
then the numeral '3' must refer to a necessary existent, too. And it should now be obvious
how to extend these considerations to apply to the rest of numerals.
There is, then, some reason to think that in order for an item to be a candidate to be
the referent of a numeral, it must itself be a necessary existent. Some reason, but perhaps
not every reason. For some philosophers will perhaps be disturbed by the very idea of a
necessary existent, perhaps because they believe that all there is are ordinary objects such
as persons, mountains and rivers, perhaps because they believe that necessary existents are
mysterious objects, and that we had better forego them. Whatever the reason, it is plain
that the claim that numbers are objects that exist necessarily is a pretty strong claim by
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the lights of those who believe that no object exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity,
so strong, they may say, that it calls into question the arguments of this section.
These philosophers will of course be utterly unimpressed by arguments like that from
(7) to (10) on the grounds that numerals are better viewed as non-rigid terms that may
be taken to refer to different objects in different possible worlds. And they will similarly
object to arguments like that from (11) to (14) by proclaiming that, despite appearances,
sentence (11) is either plainly false or true, but not for the reasons we have assumed.
There are two main lines such a philosopher may take in order to resist arguments like
that from (11) to (14).
One strategy is to proclaim that, despite appearances to the contrary, (11) is false.
Doubtless, it will not be open to them to deny that we do assent to (11). Nor will they be
able to deny that we invariably infer (11) from: whatever the number of Jupiter's moons is,
it would have remained the number of Jupiter's moons even if Mo Vaughn hadn't existed.
Nevertheless, they might still question the need to take the fact that we assent to (11) at
face value, and propose instead to encode a sentence like (11) as:
(15) There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons, and if Mo Vaughn
had not existed, there would have been a number which would have been the same
number as the actual number of Jupiter's major moons is and would have numbered
Jupiter's major moons.
where the relation "the same number as" is of course not to be confused with the identity
relation, but is rather construed as a transworld relation that holds between referents of
the numerals in different possible worlds. Thus for example, if '4' refers to Mo Vaughn
in the actual world, but to Nomar Garciaparra in another possible world, w, which is as
much like the actual world as possible except for the fact that Mo Vaughn doesn't exist
in w, then 4, i.e., Mo Vaughn, is the number of Jupiter's major moons and, in w, where
Mo Vaughn doesn't exist, the same number, 4, i.e., Nomar Garciaparra, is the number of
Jupiter's moons.
This strategy has the advantage that it would seem to encode much of ordinary usage
in metaphysically benign terms that do not require numbers to be necessary existents. All
I can do in the face of this is to repeat that we do make the inference from: "whatever the
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number of Jupiter's moons is, it would have remained the number of Jupiter's moons, even
if Mo Vaughn had not existed" to (11), that we hold (11) true, and that to recast (11) in
terms of (15) would be to distort an important feature of our use of the numerals and other
number words in modal and counterfactual contexts. Therefore, if one takes our use of the
numerals and other numerical terms at face value, then she has to conclude that they refer
to necessary existents. Moreover, since I am inclined to think that there may well be objects
that could not have failed to exist, and I know of no independent reasons to refuse to take
our use of number words at face value, I stand by my claim that the arguments presented
here are evidence for the non-identity of numbers with objects that exist contingently such
as people, mountains, and rivers.
The other line of response to the argument from (11) to (16) I would like us to consider
is to admit that (11) is true, but to deny that it is true for the reasons one would normally
assume.13 (11) is true, the reply continues, not because the number of Jupiter's moons
exists in possible worlds in which Mo Vaughn doesn't exist, but rather because "is the
number of" is (or can be) a transworld relation. Thus it may be claimed that (11) might
be read as:
(16) The actual number of Jupiter's major moons is such that, in the actual world, it
would have numbered Jupiter's major moons even in a circumstance in which Mo
Vaughn had not existed.
More can be said: unless the number 4 is identical with one of Jupiter's major moons, it is
true that, in the actual world, the number 4 would have numbered Jupiter's major moons
even in a circumstance in which the number 4 itself had not existed.
This alternative interpretation may perhaps be motivated with the help of an analogy.
For consider what (17) says:
(17) Jupiter is brighter than whatever planet would have been closest to Saturn had
Jupiter not existed.
'SThanks are due here to Stephen Yablo.
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It may be argued that the claim made by (17) is not of course the non-sensical claim that
Jupiter, in a possible world as much like the actual as possible in which Jupiter doesn't
exist, is brighter than whatever planet happens to be closest to Saturn. Rather, (17) may
be taken to make a transworld comparison: Jupiter in the actual world is brighter than
whatever planet is closest to Saturn in a possible world in which Jupiter doesn't exist.
Likewise, then, the claim made by (16) may be taken to involve a transworld relation
between a number, which may or may not be Mo Vaughn, and Jupiter's major moons as
they exist in a possible circumstance in which Mo Vaughn doesn't exist. The move may be
resisted by denying, in general, that sentences like (16) and (17) can be read to involve a
transworld relation. Or, more modestly, by denying that a sentence like (16) can be read in
the way just now suggested. Though I am inclined to entertain doubts about the availability
of such an interpretation, I think that it would be somewhat unsatisfying to rest a rejoinder
on such reservations.
Fortunately, I think there is a different line of response. This alternative line proceeds
from the observation that the line of argument of this section extends to arguments based
on counterfactuals, which, first, don't involve the relation "is the same number as," and,
second, cannot be read in the manner suggested by the objection. An example of common
such counterfactuals can be drawn from public key cryptography, which nowadays makes
network communications secure.14 A public key is a number a message recipient sends to
a sender to allow the latter to encrypt the message to be sent. This number is generally
the product of two very large primes, and therefore it is extremely difficult to factor. Now:
once the sender receives the public key, she uses some mathematical function to scramble
the message, and proceeds to send the result to the message recipient. At this point, the
message can only be decrypted by someone who knows the original primes; in this case, the
message recipient. This is a relatively straightforward arithmetical application, but observe
that we are indeed committed to the truth of a counterfactual such as:
(18) There are two primes which would decrypt the message, that is, would generate
a certain value as arguments of a certain mathematical function, even if Jupiter's
14 A similar example was suggested to me by Michael Glanzberg.
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moon Europa ceased to exist on Thursday, July 29 at 4 pm.
This conterfactual provides us with a guarantee that the message would be decrypted
by the two large primes in questions even in a circumstance in which Jupiter's moon Europa
ceased to exist on Thursday, July 29 at 4 pm. Otherwise, public key cryptography would
be useless for practical purposes; as a message recipient, I would need to check a variety of
facts concerning which objects exist in which circumstances in order to make sure that I
would still be able to decode the message in each circumstance.
The important point to be noticed is that, from (18), a few steps will lead us to an
argument whose conclusion is incompatible with the assumption that Europa is the referent
of one of the numerals for the two primes in question. Yet, (18) cannot be read to make a
claim about a transworld relation that connects two very large primes in the actual world
with the value of a certain mathematical function in some other possible world.
This is not to deny that (18) could be recast in the manner suggested by the line of
objection we considered before as:
(19) There are two prime numbers that decrypt the message, and if Jupiter's moon
Europa ceased to exist on Thursday, July 29 at 4 pm., there would be two numbers
which would be the same numbers as the two prime numbers that decrypt the
message and which would decrypt the message.
However, the comments made before in response to that general line apply to this particular
case, too.
I think we should conclude that the arguments of this section provide us with some reason
for the conclusion that numerals cannot be taken to refer to objects that exist contingently.
As I have stated it, this conclusion excludes ordinary objects as the sort of items to which
numerals may not be taken to refer, but it also extends to a variety of objects commonly
labeled "abstract." For example, consider the singleton of Mo Vaughn. If one assumes that
Mo Vaughn's singleton can only exist in possible worlds in which Mo Vaughn does, then
the argument that results from replacing the occurrences of the term 'Mo Vaughn' by the
term '{Mo Vaughn}' in (11), (12), (13), and (14) establishes the non-identity of the number
4 with Mo Vaughn's singleton. Similar considerations apply to other abstract objects that
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exist contingently, such as the Red Sox or the American League.
The arguments presented thus far were aimed to establish that, provided that numerals
refer, they refer to necessary existents. Yet, there are a variety of features people often
ascribe to numbers other than necessary existence; numbers are often labeled "abstract,"
claimed to lack specific spatio-te. I, oral location, and some discussions even suggest that
numbers, and other mathematical objects, have little by way of intrinsic structure. I would
like to end this section with the observation that the analogy between temporality and
modality suggests that the general line of argument presented here can be extended to
exclude the possibility that numerical terms refer to objects that exist at a time, but not at
another. The analogy, in particular, suggests a temporal counterpart of the argument from
(11) to (14):
(11') There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which was
the number of Jupiter's moons even in 1944, when Mo Vaughn did n't yet exist,
we can infer:
(12') There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which existed
even in 1944, when Mo Vaughn did not yet exist.
Therefore,
(13') There is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which, in
1944, was different from Mo Vaughn,
which, again, coupled with a principle that gives partial expression to what may be called
the eternity of identity:
(EI) VVy (P(x = y) -,+ x = y),
where P is the temporal operator "It has been the case that," 5 delivers:
1sThe other principle that gives expression to the eternity of identity is: VzVy (F(x = y) -- z = y), where
F is the operator: "It will be the case that."
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(14') ere is a number that is the number of Jupiter's major moons and which is
differ from Mo Vaughn.
The important point to noticed now is that the truth of both (14') and the sentence
"The number of Jupiter's moons is 4" are jointly incompatible with the assumption that
the numeral '4' refers to Mo Vaughn, which, once again, is the conclusion we wanted.
It is an interesting question whether a similar line of argument could be used to that
numbers are not the sorts of objects that exist at a place but not at another, but note that
such an argument would be importantly different from other, more traditional arguments
from the premise that numbers are necessary existents to the conclusion that they lack
specific spatio-temporal location. Here is an example of a different argument to the effect
that if an individual has a certain spatio-temporal location, then it is not a necessary
existent: if an individual, x, has a certain spatio-temporal location in the actual world,
then we can surely imagine a possible world, w, as much as possible like the actual world
with the difference that, in w, nothing occupies the location of x in the actual world. It
seems right to say that x doesn't exist in w, and therefore that there is a possible world
in which x doesn't exist. Therefore, if an individual x is spatio-temporally located, then
x is not a necessary existent. But then, since numbers are necessary existents, then, by
the preceding argument, they must lack a spatio-temporal location. What is the force
of this argument is, however, a question which I shall not address here; suffice it to say
that suspiciously similar considerations are sometimes employed to cast doubt upon the
assumption that there are objects that exist necessarily: it would seem that one can always
imagine an object away; to conceive of a circumstance in which the object doesn't exist.
But then, if that circumstance constitutes a genuine possibility, it would seem that it is a
possible world in which the object under consideration does not exist.
1.3 Three remarks on the general line of argument
I have claimed that there are central features of our use of the numerals that place serious
constraints on the sorts of objects to which we may take the numerals to refer. In particular,
I have argued that it is not open to us to interpret the numerals to refer to objects that
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exist contingently, such as people, mountains, or rivers. For, otherwise, our practices in
the use of the numerals to describe counterfactual circumstances could not be sustained;
sentences (8) and (13) are cases in point. This, I claim, is what the former line of argument
establishes. It is now time to comment on what it is not aimed to - and, I think, does not
- establish.
Two remarks on what the former line of reasoning is not aimed to accomplish:
First, it might be thought that the connection between sentences of the form "There are
n F's" and sentences oi the form "The number of F's is n" provides us with a priori grounds
for believing in the (necessary) existence of numbers. For example, it might be suggested
that the connection between the sentence "There are no objects that are not self-identical"
and the sentence "The number of objects that are not self-identical is 0" provides us with
a priori grounds for believing that the number 0 exists. After all, we know a priori that
there are no objects that are not self-identical, and we all seem disposed to assert that the
number of objects that are not self-identical is 0 simply on the grounds that there are no
such objects.
Should we conclude that we know a priori that the number 0 exists?
If we do, then we can make use of the line of argument outlined by Tennant to infer the
(necessary) existence of the rest of numbers on a priori grounds, too.
Now, I want to stress that, whatever else it may achieve, the line of argument given
here doesn't provide us with a priori grounds for believing in the (necessary) existence of
numbers. For let us look more closely at the biconditional:
(20) The number of objects that are not self-identical = 0 if and only if Vx -Q(z $ x).
Admittedly, we know a priori that the right-hand-side of (20) is true. And if we could know
a priori that the biconditional, (20), is true, then we would certainly have a priori grounds
for the belief that the left-hand-side of (20) is true. And hence a priori grounds for the
belief that the number 0 exists. But now, do we know a priori that the biconditional (20)
is true? I think not, and hence I think that, even though we know a priori that there are
no objects that are not self-identical, we have no a priori grounds for the belief that the
number 0 exists.
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It is not, of course, that I seriously doubt (or think you should doubt) that the number 0
exists. Rather, the point I want to make is that, whatever else the source of our confidence
in the existence of the number 0 may be, it is not simply the fact that there are no objects
that are not self-identical.
But even if the line of argument given here doesn't provide us with a priori grounds for
the belief in the necessary existence of numbers, it might plausibly be thought to provide us
with a priori grounds for the next best claim to the necessary existence of numbers, namely,
that if there are numbers, then they are necessary existents:
(21) Numbers exist -+ O Numbers exist.
Notice that for all that (21) implies, it might still be the case that there are no numbers.
Matters, however, are more complicated. For a little reflection on an exceedingly familiar
argument will convince us that:
(22) O Numbers exist -+ Numbers exist.
Suppose there is a possible world w in which numbers exist. Then, by arguments like the
ones given in the preceding section, one might be able to establish that they are not identical
with objects which exist contingently, and hence that they are necessary existents. Since
they are necessary existents, they exist in every possible world, and, in particular, they
exist in the actual world. 16
This is, as I say, a familiar argument, as one may recognize in it the form of Anselhn's
argument from the possibility of existence of God to God's actual existence. One remarkable
consequence of this argument is that in order for one to reject the existence of the numbers,
one must be committed not only to the claim that there are no numbers, but also to the
further claim that their existence is impossible, which may seem to put the nominalist
in dialectical disadvantage. The argument, however, cuts both ways: in order for one to
coherently maintain that there are numbers, one is forced to deny not only that numbers
don't exist, but also that they could have failed to exist.
'eThe argument takes place in S5, but it is, I think, reasonable to suppose that what is metaphysically
necessary in one possible world is necessary in all possible worlds.
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The second remark I want to make is that the aim of the arguments I have presented
is to narrow down the range of candidates to be the referents of the numerals, but not to
challenge the inscrutability of numerical reference, the moral of the permutation argument
with which we started, that is, the conclusion that the reference of the numerals is hopelessly
inscrutable. For to admit that our use of the numerals in counterfactual contexts determines
that they refer to necessary existents is to advance little if at all in settling the question
to which, if one, of several necessary existents numerals refer: if we are uncertain whether
numbers are Zermelo, rather than, for example, von Neumann ordinals, then, if, as most
philosophers seem to suppose, pure sets are necessary existents, it will be of no help at all
to know that numbers are necessary existents. In other words, even after we have corrected
the thesis that the reference of the numerals is determined no more precisely than up
to isomorphism, the fundamental problem of the inscrutability of reference still confronts
us: no combination of intentions, central features of usage, and other non-linguistic facts
that will ever enable us to discern the referents of the numerals from among the members of
countless isomorphic copies of the natural number system consisting exclusively of abstracta.
I should like to conclude this section with a positive note. The moral of the permutation
argument with which we started is that it is possible to permute the referents of the numerals
without shift in the truth conditions of complete sentences. It may be of interest to notice
that modal and counterfactual considerations of the sort we have used can be utilized to
establish that it is not possible to permute the referents of the numerals with items other
than numbers, and to nevertheless preserve the truth conditions, indeed the truth values,
of all complete sentences of the language.
To the best of my knowledge, the first use of a permutation argument to draw a perfectly
general point about reference is due to Richard Jeffrey, who envisaged a permutation of the
domain of all individuals which exchanged each person with his or her social security num-
ber, but which permuted all the rest of individuals onto themselves. He then noticed that,
provided that all the necessary compensatory changes are made in the interpretation of the
rest of predicates of the language, such a permutation could be shown to preserve the truth
values of all complete sentences of the language. Putnam's twist on the permutation argu-
ment is well-known: not only can the truth values of complete sentences be preserved, even
30
CHAPTER 1. NUMBERS AND PERSONS
their truth conditions can be preserved. In particular, a permutation of the domain which
exchanges numbers with persons ought to preserve the truth conditions of all sentences of
the language.
What I would like to suggest is that, contrary to what Jeffrey's, and, more generally,
Putnam's permutation argument might have suggested, it cannot be done. Tob vary Jeffrey's
example, suppose that we want to devise a reinterpretation of the language that preserves
the truth conditions of complete sentences but exchanges the referent of the uniform num-
bers of the 1998 Red Sax with the members of the 1998 Red Sax. Putnam's general method
consists first in specifying a permutation of the domain of individuals that exchanges each
member of the 1998 Red SKx with his uniform number. For the sake of simplicity, consider
the permutation of the domain, r, which exchanges each member of the 1998 Red Sox with
his uniform number, but permutes all the rest of individuals onto themselves.
With ir in place, we are in a position to generate a systematic reinterpretation of the
language. First, reinterpret each term of the language to refer to the object onto which the
permutation takes the actual referent. Since the permutation takes the number 42 onto Mo
Vaughn, the numeral '42' is to be reinterpreted to refer to Mo Vaughn. Conversely, since
the permutation takes the number Mo Vaughn onto the number 42, the name 'Mo Vaughn'
is to be reinterpreted to refer to the number 42. The next step is to reinterpret each n-adic
predicate of the language to take as its new extension the set of n-tuples whose members are
the n-tuples onto which the permutation takes the n-tuples in its actual extension. Thus,
for example, reinterpret the predicate 'x is even' is to be reinterpreted as: '7r(x) is even',
which of course amounts to:
'z is even and is distinct from the number of a member of the 1998 Red Sox or is
a member of the 1998 Red Sox with an even uniform number'
And, likewise, a predicate like 'x used to play first base for the Red Sox in 1998' as:
'ir(z) used to play first base for the Red Sox in 1998', which again amounts to:
'z used to play first base for the Red Sox in 1998 and is distinct from Mo Vaughn
or is the number 42'.
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It is evident that such a reinterpretation will preserve the truth values of every exten-
sional eternal sentence of the language, but the scope of Putnam's argument is supposed to
be considerably wider than that. In the Appendix to (Putnam, 1981), Putnam proved that
such an uniform reinterpretation is bounded to preserve the truth values of a wide range of
modal and counterfactual sentences, too. For consider r', a permutation of the domain of
individuals in each possible world which coincides with r in the values it assigns to actual
individuals, and permutes individuals in other possible worlds onto themselves. A little
reflection shows that, since the switch preserves the truth values of each atomic sentence in
each possible world, it does not disturb the truth values assigned to compound sentences
by modal sentential logic or by the standard sentential logic of counterfactuals.
A permutation of the domain of individuals in each possible world that exchanges actual
individuals but permutes individuals in other possible worlds onto themselves will perhaps
do well with modal sentential logic and with the sentential logic of counterfactuals, but it
will fail to preserve the truth values of more complex modal and counterfactual sentences.
For example, consider a modal sentence like:
(23) There is a number which might have played first base for the 1999 Red Sox.
The difficulty is that, under the reinterpretation induced by 7', (23) is true in the actual
world. For, under the reinterpretation, Mo Vaughn is both an individual to which the
predicate 'is a number' applies in the actual world, and an individual to which the predicate
'plays first base for the 1999 Red Sox' applies in a possible world other than the actual world.
It transpires that Mo Vaughn is, under the reinterpretation, an individual to which the
modal predicate 'might have played for the 1999 Red Sox' applies in the actual world. But
(23) is then a sentence whose truth value is not preserved by the systematic reinterpretation
induced by r'.
It is not difficult to amend Putnam's method in order to deal with the difficulty just now
raised. Take a permutation of the domain of all individuals in the actual world, and let it
work across all possible worlds. That permutation will induce a systematic reinterpretation
of the language that falsifies sentence (23), since, under the reinterpretation, the predicate
'plays first base for the 1999 Red Sox' will now apply to Mo Vaughn in no possible world.
Yet, there remains a more persistent difficulty raised by modal and counterfactual sentences
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similar to the ones considered in former sections. For consider the sentence:
(24) There is a number which would have not existed if no one had survived WWII.' 7
For again, let wo a possible world as much like the actual world as possible in which no one
survives WWII. Mo Vaughn doesn't exist at w, and, since Mo Vaughn is both an individual
to which, under the reinterpretation, the predicate 'is a number' applies in the actual world
and an individual which wouldn't have existed if no one had survived WWII, under the
reinterpretation, sentence (24) is evaluated true in the actual world. Of course since we
all view (24) as false, we conclude that the reinterpretation fails to preserve the conditions
under which we assent to modal and counterfactual sentences of the language.
A perfectly general point can be extracted from the example. To guarantee that a
permutation preserves the truth-conditions for all modal and counterfactual sentences, we
need to make sure that that each number is permuted onto another individual which exists
necessarily, too. Otherwise, it will not be difficult to come up with counterfactuals of
the form of (24) whose truth values are not preserved by the permutation. This is not a
serious constraint, as it permits one to exchange the natural numbers with a wide variety
of necessary existents.
Of course, the example cuts both ways: not only does it suggest that no permutation
of the domain of all individuals can be used to devise an interpretation of the numerals
that takes them to refer to ordinary objects, it also suggests that no permutation of the
domain of all individuals induces a reinterpretation of the language that takes names of
ordinary objects to refer to numbers, or to other necessary existents. Indeed, it would seem
that in order to obtain a systematic reinterpretation of the language that does preserve the
truth values of all modal and counterfactual sentences, one needs to make sure that each
individual is exchanged with another individual which exists in exactly the same possible
worlds. For it is not difficult to see that if one tries to exchange Mo Vaughn with another
ordinary object which exists in different possible worlds than him, such as for example the
Eiffel Tower, one will not be able to preserve the truth value of counterfactuals such as:
"
17This example is similar to one given by Vann McGee in "Does "Refers in the Language you Speak"
Refer in the Language you Speak?"
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(25) There is a person who would have never existed if Gustave Eiffel had never built
a tower in Paris.
This may not seem a serious constraint for necessary existents such as numbers, but it is
indeed a serious one for ordinary objects like Mo Vaughn; it allows us to exchange him with
his unit set, but not with objects that exist in possible worlds in which he doesn't exist.
These considerations suggest that the truth conditions of complete sentences would seem
to determine the reference of our terms and predicates much more determinately than up
to isomorphism. What is the force of these considerations is, however, a difficult question
I cannot hope to address here.
1.4 Conclusion
I have argued for the the thesis that the truth of a variety of numerical sentences whose
acceptance plays a crucial role in applications determines the reference of the numerals, as
we ordinarily use them, much more precisely than up to isomorphism. In particular, there
are a variety of modal and counterfactual sentences that play an important role in cardinal
applications whose truth is incompatible with the assumption that contingent existents are
candidates to be the referents of the numerals, as we ordinarily use them. An immediate
consequence of this thesis is that the Aristotelian view with respect to arithmetic is not
tenable. There are aspects of the natural numbers other than their position in the natural
number system that matter to us. In particular, they need to exhibit a variety of features
traditionally ascribed to abstracta in order for a variety of assertions made in contexts of
application to be sustained.
Apart from the constraint that numbers be abstract, there are no aspects of the natural
numbers that can be used to discern them from the members of another isomorphic copy
of the natural system consisting exclusively of abstracta. Thus, although the problem of
the inscrutability of numerical reference still confronts us, we can now venture an attractive
account of the truth conditions of numerical sentences: a sentence of arithmetic, for example,
is true if and only if it is true in every isomorphic copy of the natural number system
consisting exclusively of abstracta. Or, equivalently, if and only if it is true in some such
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isomorphic copy of the natural number system.
I should like to conclude with a somewhat speculative note. Though this is not the
place to discuss the question whether the inscrutability of reference is a perfectly general
phenomenon, and not one restricted to the numerical case, provided that, whatever the
subject matter, reference is inscrutable, a little reflection on the numerical case suggests
that the claim that reference is never determined more precisely than up to isomorphism
may, in the end, be much more difficult to sustain than some philosophers have advanced.
Fbr it is arguable that the numerical case provides the best possible scenario for that claim,
and that, since the truth conditions of modal and counterfactual sentences defeat the claim
that reference is determined no more precisely than up to isomorphism, the truth conditions
of modal and counterfactual sentences can likewise determine the reference of our terms
more precisely than up to isomorphism in the general case, too. This, however, is a topic
for another occasion.
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Chapter 2
Modern Set Theory and
Replacement
2.1 Introduction
In "Must we believe in set theory," an article in his recent collection Logic, Logic and Logic,'
George Boolos records the uncontroversial fact that it is a theorem of Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory plus the axiom of choice (ZFC) that there is a cardinal n which is equal to H5 .
That cardinal is the limit of the sequence {Ro, N H, R o, ... }, i.e., U{f(i) : i E w}, where
f(0) = No and f(i + 1) = RA(.- Since, as usual, cardinals are ordinals and ordinals are
von Neumann ordinals, it is a consequence of standard set theory that there are at least
K sets in existence. Yet, Boolos regards the cardinal K as an unbelievably large number,
so large that it calls into question the truth of a theory according to which there are at
least n objects in existence. He thus intimates that it is perhaps more comfortable to refuse
to accept the conjunction of those axioms of ZFC which entail the existence of K than to
accept the existence of oc. 2
1(Boolos, 1998). The essay "Must we believe in set theory?" is on pp.120-132.
2For those concerned by the fact that it is consistent with first-order ZFC that 2no - +, it maYbe better
to pick a cardinal A which is equal to 3A. That cardinal is the limit of the sequence {1o, 3. Io, 3 "..I
and may seem unbelievably large even by the lights of someone who regards the existence of the set of
real numbers as uncontroversial. The cardinals . are defined as usual: f:o = No, .+li = 23a, and23x = U{~:: "# < )
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What Boolos contemplates in "Must we believe in set theory?" is of course not the
rejection of set theory, but merely the rejection of that part of set theory that is far removed
from ordinary experience, the rest of physical science and ordinary mathematics. Now: it
is not obvious that Boolos' concern supplies us with a reason to refuse to accept a specific
axiom (or list of axioms) of ZFC, as opposed to the conjunction of those axioms that are used
in the derivation of the existence of n. A standard pattern of argument for the existence of
n is to define a map from w, whose existence is a consequence of the axiom of infinity, onto
the sets in the sequence No, Not, N o, ..., which, by an instance of replacement, form a
set, and, then, to appeal to the union axiom to derive the existence of UtNo, K Nx, KNXo, ".'),
which is just n. Perhaps it is unreasonable to think that the axioms of infinity and union
are particularly obvious, or self-evident, but they seem to be necessary for the development
of a reasonable amount of set theory. In contrast with them, the axiom of replacement has
been questioned by a number of authors, who have adduced independent reasons to doubt
that replacement has received adequate justification.
The axioms of replacement give partial expression to the principle that if x is a set
and R is a fu 1ctional relation which associates at most one object R1 to each element y
of X, then there is a set whose elements are the Ry's. A picture of the axiom is that if we
replace each element y of a set z by the object associated with y by R, then the result is a
set, too. This principle, independently proposed by Abraham Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem
in the 1920's, is commonly thought to be dispensable for the development of a reasonable
amount of set theory, sufficiently reasonable to provide a foundation for mainstream core
mathematics.
A common complaint against the axioms of replacement to be distinguished from Boolos'
concern is that, though they are undoubtedly required for the development of higher set
theory, they are rarely used within ordinary mathematics. The axioms of Zermelo set theory
plus the axiom of choice (ZC), a theory whose axioms are all of the axioms of ZFC with
the exception of the axioms of replacement, are generally assumed to be sufficient for the
development of ordinary mathematics. In fact, there is not one discussion of replacement
that does not call attention to the remarkable fact that no single application of replacement
within ordinary mathematics could be isolated before 1971, when Harvey Friedman proved
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that an application of replacement on an uncountable set was required to establish that
every Borel game is determined, a result that Donald Martin would later prove in 1975.3
This fact is invariably supposed to illustrate how recondite the applications of replacement
within ordinary mathematics are.
There is yet another complaint sometimes raised against replacement. This is the obser-
vation that, whereas there is a single conception of set, the iterative conception, that can be
used to motivate all the axioms of ZC (with the possible exception of the axiom of choice),
there is no conception of set that can be used to show the axioms of ZFC, the theory that
results when replacement is added to the axioms of Zermelo set theory, to be more than an
ad hoc list of principles chosen for their apparent consistency and their ability to deliver
desired theorems of ordinary mathematics. The iterative conception is the view that sets
are formed in stages of a certain cumulative hierarchy; a condensed version of the concep-
tion consists of principles concerning stages and principles concerning sets and stages. The
principles concerning stages are aimed to ensure both that stages are well-ordered by a re-
lation, earlier than, and that there is at least one limit stage, a stage that is later than some
stage, but not immediately later than a stage earlier than it. The principles concerning sets
and stages are designed to make sure both that a set is formed at a stage if and only if its
elements are all formed at stages earlier than it and that, given some sets formed at stages
earlier than some stage, they are the members of some set.
One reason the iterative conception cannot be utilized to motivate all the axioms of ZFC
is that, as it has been persuasively argued, the axioms of replacement cannot be derived just
from the principles concerning sets and stages implicit in the presentation of the iterative
conception just now given.4 For it is consistent with that presentation that there be a set z
3(Martin, 1975) contains the first proof of Borel determinacy. (Friedman, 1971) showed that replacement
is required for the proof of Borel determinacy, and it contains a discussion of the claim, often made prior to
1975, that replacement plays no role within ordinary mathematics.
4The details of this characterization of the iterative conception and its relation with replacement are
presented in detail in (Boolos, 1989). Additional presentations of the iterative conception that omit re-
placement can be found in (van Aken, 1988) and (Potter, 1990). I should mention, though, that there are
both more expansive elaborations of the iterative conception on which replacement and much more can be
derived, such as Giidel's own elaboration of the iterative conception, and less expansive accounts of the
iterative conception on which not even the axiom schema of separation can be derived as a consequence,
such as Lavine's account in (Lavine, 1994).
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and a functional relation R such that the sets Ry, which the functional relation R associates
to the members y of z, occur at arbitrarily high stages of the cumulative hierarchy - this
would surely be the case, for example, if the cumulative hierarchy consisted of a countable
number of stages.
There is, to be sure, a different conception of set that can be used to motivate replace-
ment, the limitation of size conception of set. According to the limitation of size idea,
objects form a set if and only if there are not too many of them. But then, if z is a set,
then there are not too many members of z, and consequently, if R is a functional relation,
then there are not too many objects R, associated to the members y of x by R. Different
answers to the question how many are too many result in different versions of the limita-
tion view. What is perhaps the strongest limitation of size principle is due to John von
Neumann. According to von Neumann's version of the limitation of size doctrine, objects
form a set if and only if they are not in one-one correspondence with all the objects there
are. This yields replacement, too. If x is a set, then its members are not in one-one cor-
respondence with all the objects there are. Nor are the objects Ry, which the functional
relation associates to the members y of x, in one-one correspondence with all the objects
there are.5 Though limitation of size accounts for a large part of set theory, it also omits
much of importance; in particular, it lacks the resources to account for two axioms that
are crucial to any reasonable development of set theory, i.e., the axioms of power set and
infinity.6
There are other heuristic principles that can be utilized to motivate replacement. Most
set theorists, for example, regard it as plausible that, for each structural property of the
universe, there is a set-sized model, indeed one of the form (V1, E n(V, x Vs)), that exhibits
that property. The principle of reflection is a heuristic principle that can be used to motivate
replacement; indeed, it is a result due to Azriel Levy that, to the limited extent to which
reflection can be formalized in the language of first-order set theory, it is equivalent to the
"Modulo some form of choice, which is required to infer that the range of R on z is indeed in one-one
correspondence with z. Thanks are due here to Richard Cartwright.
8 A thorough discussion of the shortcomings of different versions of limitation of size as providing a
justification of both axioms can be found in (Hallett, 1984), especially chapters 4 and 8.
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combination of the axioms of infinity and replacement. 7 But the point still remains that
it would be a mistake to suppose that there is a set of persuasive intuitive considerations
in favor of the axioms of Zermelo set theory that can be used to motivate the axioms of
replacement as well.
In practice, set theorists have more argument for the adoption of replacement than the
intuitive plausibility arguments I have mentioned thus far. In the context of standard set
theory, the axiom of replacement is adopted because it is required for the development of
an attractive theory of ordinals, on which ordinals are transitive sets well-ordered by E, as
well as for a justification of the much used method of definition by transfinite recursion on
the ordinals. The method of transfinite recursion on the ordinals permits us to define an
important cumulative hierarchy of levels or stages:
Vo = 0; Va+1 = P(Va); VA = Up•,, for limit ordinals A,
where V = U. Va. The interest of this cumulative hierarchy is that it gives expression to
the modern, cumulative view of the set-theoretic universe, and can be utilized to motivate
the axioms of standard set theory as a description of the V,'s. Thus, a little reflection on
the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZFC) shows that V,, the first transfinite level of
the hierarchy, is a model of all the axioms of ZFC with the exception of the axiom of infinity.
And, in general, one finds that if K is a strongly inaccessible ordinal, then V, is a model of
all of the axioms of ZFC.5 (For all these models, we take E to be the standard element-set
relation restricted to the members of the domain). Now, similarly, if VA is an initial segment
of the cumulative hierarchy indexed by a limit ordinal A > w, then (VA, E n(VA x VA)) is a
model of Zermelo set theory plus choice.
One may be tempted to view the axioms of Zermelo set theory plus choice as an implicit
description of the initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy indexed by a limit ordinal
A > w and replacement as a mere closure postulate on the ordinal levels of the hierarchy,
7Cf. (Levy, 1960). Levy established that the principle:
is equivalent to the combination of infinity and replacement.
SAn ordinal n is strongly inaccessible if and only if a > w and a is regular and a strong limit, that is, if
A < n, then 2X < n.
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necessary to ensure that the cumulation of sets does not close off at V,+,, the second
limit level of the cumulative structure, but dispensable within the first w + w levels of
the hierarchy. Therefore, since V,+, contains isomorphic copies of the real and complex
numbers, subsets and functions on the real numbers, and the rest of objects studied in
classical mathematics, replacement would seem dispensable for set theory to provide a
foundation for mathematics. 9 Indeed, it is precisely this picture of replacement, combined
perhaps with the fact that it may be argued that it is independent from the iterative
conception of set, that has led a number of theorists to question the assumption that
there are compelling reasons to accept the axiom of replacement in the first place. Thus
for example, Michael Potter omits the axiom of replacement from his development of set
theory in (Potter, 1990) on the grounds that it is an "unnecessary assumption," one which
is "not needed in any but the most esoteric parts of mathematics: only one result outside
set theory - the assertion that every Borel game is determined -- has so far been shown
to require anything approaching the strength of replacement for its proof."'
What I would like to do in the first part of this chapter is to challenge this picture of
replacement as an axiom with no applications within the first V,+, stages of the cumulative
hierarchy. Thus, it will transpire that there are important, often neglected applications of a
restricted version of replacement that take place at remarkably low levels of the cumulative
hierarchy. Most of these applications will concern the special case of replacement according
to which if x is a countable set, and R is a functional relation, then the objects, Ry's, which
R associates to each element y of x, form a (countable) set.11 Though these applications of
countable replacement will not directly support the acceptance of the common, unrestricted
version of the axiom, they will certainly make it plain that it would be ill-advised to abandon
the axiom in the absence of another principle to replace it.
Even after the picture of replacement as an axiom far removed from the lower levels
9The introduction of (Friedman, 1971) outlines just this picture of replacement and its role in mathemat-
ical practice.
'oCf. (Potter, 1990), p. 64.
" Note that this restriction of replacement to countable sets coheres well with an unexceptionable and well-
established part of mathematical practice, since the formation of arbitrary countable sequences in routine
in modern analysis.
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of the cumulative hierarchy is corrected, the question remains of whether we must believe
in the unrestricted form of replacement that permits the formation of uncountable sets by
replacement on other initial uncountable sets, when it is a principle with very few rare and
exotic applications outside higher set theory. I shall suggest that there is no reason to think
that there are persuasive direct intuitive considerations in favor of replacement that justify
the axiom, and I shall then investigate the extent to which the internal needs of set theory
require the full exercise of replacement. The results of this inquiry may not, in the end,
decide the question of whether we must believe in replacement, but they may certainly be
of help to someone with revisionary inclinations to discern what is involved in the decision
to abandon replacement.
2.2 Basic set theory and replacement
I have explained that it is not uncommon for discussions of the axiom of replacement to focus
on the question of what is the motivation for accepting the axiom of replacement, when
replacement is a principle with such rare and exotic applications. The first point to be
noticed is that this is a pseudo-question. There are important, often neglected applications
of the axiom of replacement that are required within the first w + w levels of the cumulative
hierarchy, and are thus quite independent from the internal needs of higher set theory.
Most of these applications involve countable instances of replacement, or, more precisely,
instances of replacement on countable sets, and one may justifiably doubt that they provide
us with compelling reasons for accepting full replacement. What they do establish is that
instances of replacement on countable sets pervade set theory.
The theory that results when the axioms of replacement are omitted from the axioms
of standard set theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice, is Zermelo
set theory plus choice, a direct descendant of Zermelo's 1908 axiomatization of set theory.
Zermelo's 1908 axiom system consisted of seven axioms: axioms of extensionality (axiom
I); null set and pairs (axiom II); Aussonderungsaxioms, power set, and union (axioms III,
IV, and V); an axiom of choice (axiom VI); and an axiom of infinity (axiom VII). This last
axiom asserts the existence of Zo, the Zermelo number sequence, the C-least set obtained
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from the null set by repeated application of the unit set operation. 12
From the point of view of standard set theory, one serious omission from Zermelo's 1908
axiomatization is that it allows for the existence of non-well-founded sets.13 For example,
it is possible to construct a model of the Zermelo axioms in which there is a set whose sole
member is itself. To exclude this and related anomalies, we add the axiom of regularity or
foundation,
Reg Vx(3y(y E x) -+,3y(y E z A y ns = 0)),
to the rest of axioms of standard set theory. According to prevailing usage, Zermelo set
theory is a theory which consists of versions of all of the axioms of Zermelo's 1908 system
with the exception of choice and with the addition of the axiom of regularity, with the
proviso that the adoption of different versions of these axioms result in different variants of
Zermelo set theory.
We are going to see that what are perhaps the most common variants of Zermelo set
theory are subject to a number of serious drawbacks; it will transpire, for example, that
differing formulations of the axiom of infinity give rise to different versions of Zermelo set
theory which are not adequate to prove the existence of sets that are remarkably simple
both in terms of cardinality and in terms of their place in the cumulative hierarchy. Other
shortcomings of different versions of Zermelo set theory concern their inability to prove all
instances of the (first-order) principle of E-induction as well as to describe and assert the
first-order content of the cumulative picture. The results of this section will not depend
upon the presence or absence of the axiom choice, and, consequently, there will be no loss
of generality in following prevailing usage by not including choice as one of the axioms of
the different variants of Zermelo set theory we will consider.
Axioms of infinity for Zermelo set theory. There are a variety of alternative formu-
lations of the axiom of infinity, not all of them interderivable. The purpose of this section
is to review the relative strength of familiar versions of infinity, and establish the inability
12This development occurs in (Zermelo, 1908b).
'
3 The other serious omission from the point of view of standard set theory is replacement.
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of some of these formulations, modulo the rest of the Zermelo axioms (Z-), to prove the
existence of HF, the set of all hereditarily finite sets, as a consequence.
Though our primary interest in this section is to discern what can and cannot be proved
from first-order variants of Zermelo set theory in the absence of replacement, most of the
constructions used in the proofs of the independence results of this and next sections sustain
a much more general conclusion to the effect that second-order variants of Zermelo set theory
can be satisfied in models in which certain first-order sentences are false. To attain further
generality, then, we will focus directly on second-order formulations of Zermelo set theory.
Zermelo's original axiom of infinity asserts the existence of a set which contains the null
set and which contains a unit set of any set it contains:
Infz 3y( E y A Vx(x E y -+ {z} e y)).
This axiom permits one to prove the existence of the set Zo = {0, {0}, {{0}}, ...}, Zer-
melo's number sequence, as an immediate consequence, and still occurs in some presenta-
tions of standard set theory. Z-+Infz is the version of Zermelo set theory whose axiom of
infinity is Infz.
A more standard formulation of the axiom of infinity is:
Inf 3y(O E yAV^Vx(x E y -+u {x}) E y)).
Inf delivers the existence of w, the first transfinite ordinal, and appears in most treatments
of set theory. In what follows, I will abbreviate Z-+Inf as Z, in accordance with the fact
that the name Zermelo set theory is most commonly used to refer to Z-+Inf
The following sentence is an ostensibly weaker axiom of infinity:
InfDed ByBf z(Fncf A x E y A f : y -(l-.1) p - {z}).
Not only does InfDed fail to imply either Inf or Infz (modulo the axioms of Z-, of
course), as we will see in a moment, it can even be showed that no infinite set is a member
of all the models of second-order Z-+InfDed.
InfDed is equivalent, modulo the axioms of Z-, to the assertion that there exists an
ordinary infinite set, a set y which cannot be put in one-one correspondence with any set of
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natural numbers less than some natural number n. This result is due to Russell who proved
that the power set P(P(x)) of the power set P(x) of an infinite set x is Dedekind infinite. 14
It should be noted, however, that, absent choice, not only can it not be proved that no
infinite set is Dedekind finite, it cannot even be proved that there do not exist infinite sets
whose power set is Dedekind finite.15
The other, less common formulation of the axiom of infinity I want to consider is:
InfNew 3y( E yA VxVz(x E y A z E y -+ x U {z} E y)).
It is evident that this axiom of infinity implies the existence of V,, which coincides with
HF, the set of all hereditarily finite sets, as an immediate consequence, and even though it
is mentioned in the second edition of (Fraenkel-Levy, 1958) and figures as the official axiom
infinity in Azriel Levy's excellent text (Levy, 1973), it is seldom discussed in standard
treatments of set theory.
There are, to be sure, other variations on the axiom of infinity in the literature, but I
am not now concerned to present an exhaustive review. My aim rather is to point out the
existence of important, and often neglected, differences among what are perhaps the most
common versions of the axiom of infinity.16
The theories Z-+InfDed, Z-+Infz, Z, and Z-+InfNew having been set out, the time
has come to examine dependencies among them. It is evident that every theorem of second-
order Z-+InfDed, Z-+Infz and Z is a theorem of second-order Z-+InfNew, but one might
inquire whether it is the case that every theorem of second-order Z-+InfNew is a theorem
of the other variations on Zermelo set theory. There is a certain set-theoretic construction
41f z is infinite, it can be proved that for each natural number n, the set Sn of all subsets of x of cardinality
n is nonempty, and if m k n, Sm and Sn are distinct. But then, SO and the function that assigns S(n + 1)
to Sn and T itself to each subset T of P(z) not of the form Sn for some n bears witness to the fact that
P(P(x)) is Dedekind infinite. This result is sometimes erroneously attributed to Tarski, but see (Boolos,
1994) for a detailed account.
'
5 Cf. (Felgner, 1971), Chapter 3.
"I have suggested that many theorists overlook important differences among common versions of the axiom
of infinity, but I would not want to suggest that this oversight is too pervasive. For, as I should emphasize, the
relative independence, modulo the axioms of Z-, of alternative axioms of infinity is mentioned in (Bernays,
1948), and in (Fraenkel-Bar-Hillel, 1958). And some of the drawbacks at which we shall look in the course
of the discussion have been noticed before in the literature. See for example (Drake, 1974), 110-111, and
(Moschovakis, 1994), Appendix B.
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that will permit us to answer this question in the negative.17 If x is a set, define the set
M,(zx) by the recursion:
Mo(s) = z, M,,+(z) = Mn,(z) U UMn,() U(Mn(a)).
Then, the basic closure of z, M(s), is the union
M(s) = U Mn(z)
nEw
If x is a (pure) transitive set, then it is routine to verify that Mn+z(x) is just P(Mn(x)),
that M(x) is a (pure) transitive which is closed under subsets, and closed under all the
Zermelo operations.18 Thus, M(0) is V,, or, equivalently, HF, the set of all hereditarily
finite sets, and, in general, M(x) is the domain of the C-least transitive model of Z- with
the standard element-set relation which is closed under subsets and contains the set x.
As a consequence, (M(Zo),E •n(M(Zo) x M(Zo))) and (M(w), E n(M(w) x M(w))) are,
respectively, the C-least transitive models of second-order Z-+Infz and second-order Z
with the standard element-set relation.
Lemma 1. M(w) n M(Zo) = HF
Proof. That HF C M(w) n M(Zo) is an immediate consequence of the fact that both M(w)
and M(Zo) contain the null set and are closed under the power set operation.
To verify the converse inclusion, note first that Mo(Zo) n Mo(w) = {0, {0} }, a member
of HF. Suppose now that Mn(Zo) n Mn(w) is an element of HF. Then M,+ (Zo) n
Mn+i(w) = P(Mn(Zo)) n P(Mn(w)) = P(Mn(Zo) n Mn(w)). And since Mn(Zo) n Mn(w) E
HF, P(Mn (Zo) n Mn(w)) E HF. O
As an immediate consequence of this lemma, we obtain:
"The construction appears for example in (Moschovakis, 1994), p. 175. I borrow the term basic closure
from Moschovakia.
'
5 A set is closed under subsets if it contains every subset of each of its members. Proofs of all these basic
facts can be found in (Mschovakis, 1994).
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Theorem 1. There is no C-least transitive model of 2nd order Z-+InfDed with the stan-
dard element-set relation.
Hence we conclude that there is no infinite set whose existence is a logical consequence
of second-order Z-+InfDed. Two other immediate consequences of the lemma are:
Theorem 2. (M(Zo), E n(M(Zo) x M(Zo))) is not a model of 2nd order Z,
and
Theorem 3. (M(w), E n(M(w) x M(w))) is not a model of 2nd order Z- +Infz.
Proof of Theorems 2 and 3. Since M(ZonM(w) = HF and Zo 4 HF, Zo V M(w). Likewise,
since w 0 HF, w 0 M(Zo). O1
The dependencies established in this section may now be summarized in the following
diagram:
Z- +InfNew
Z -- Z-+ Infz
Z- + InfDed
In this diagram, "-+" abbreviates: "is strictly stronger than," that is, "Z-+InfNew -+ Z"
says that every theorem of Z-+InfNew is a theorem of Z, but that not every theorem of Z
is a theorem of Z-+InfNew. "Z +-7 Z-+Infz" indicates both that there are theorems of
Z that are not theorems of Z-+Infz and that there are theorems of Z-+Infz that are not
theorems of Z.
One moral to be extracted from these results is that neither of what are perhaps the
two most common second-order variants of Zermelo set theory has the resources necessary
to guarantee the existence of sets that appear at level w of the cumulative hierarchy, and
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are thus quite low down in terms of their cumulative structure - some of these sets are in
fact obtainable as the range of a Ao formula with domain w, and hence minimal in terms
of complexity, too.
Interpreting Z-+InfNew in the theories Z-+ Infz and Z. There is, then, an important
sense in which Z-+InfNew is undoubtedly superior to the two more standard variants of
Zermelo set theory Z-+Infz and Z. However, there is another question one might raise in
investigating the relative strengths of Z-+InfNew and the more familiar Z-+Infz and Z:
one might inquire whether they can be interpreted, or at least relatively interpreted in each
other. If 0 is a formula of the language of set theory, let OME be the formula that results
when z E y is replaced by the formula E(x, y) and all quantifiers are relativized to M(x).
As usual, a relative interpretation of a version of Zermelo set theory, TI, in another, T2,
consists of two formulas M(x) and E(x,y) which allow one to prove for each axiom 0 of T1,
the sentence qM,E, the interpretation of 0, as a theorem of T2.
Part of the interest of establishing the interpretability of a theory T, in another theory T2
derives from the relative consistency result which immediately follows: If TI is interpretable
in T2 , then proofs of I in T, can be turned into proofs of I in T2, and thus the consistency of
T2 implies the consistency of T1. Yet, the question whether Z-+InfNew can be interpreted
in Z-+Infz and Z has an added source of interest. There is no doubt that Z-+InfNew
permits the development of a vast part of ordinary mathematics, but, since both Z-+Infz
and Z have revealed inadequate to to secure the existence of a vast array of subsets of V,,
one might be inquire whether they are still adequate to formalize mathematical practice.
To establish the (relative) interpretability of Z-+InfNew in Z-+Infz and Z will show that,
for the purposes of formalizing mathematical practice at least, Z-+InfNew is no better than
the more standard variants of Zermelo set theory Z-+Infz and Z.
We shall now see that Z-+InfNew, Z and Z-+Infz, i.e., they all can be (relatively) inter-
preted in each other. This is of course perfeccly compatible with the fact that Z-+InfNew is
strictly stronger than both Z and Z-+ Infz, and can be seen by reflecting on Ackermann's
familiar observation that there is a model for ZF minus infinity in the natural numbers:
m E n if and only if the coefficient of 2m in the binary representation of n is 1.
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Theorem 4. Z- +InfNew is relatively interpretable in Z.
Proof Sketch. To produce a relative interpretation of first- and second-order Z-+InfNew in
first- and second-order Z, define the sequence Mn where n e w by the recursion:
Mo = w, M +l = •P(Mn) - FIN(w),
with FIN(w) = {x C w : z is finite A xz w}. The proviso that x w is necessary
in order to preserve extensionality. Let "M(x)" abbreviate: "3n x E Mn," and construct
a formula "E(x, y)" of the language of Z that expresses the relation E(x, y): "either x
and y are members of w avt, the binary numeral for y contains a 1 at the 22's place, or
z E y otherwise." The trick is to notice that Ackermann's coding can be extended to an
isomorphism from (V,+,, E n(V+,, x V,+,)) onto (M, E). It is then routine to verify that
all the interpretations of axioms of Z-+InfNew are theorems of Z. 0
An immediate corollary of this result is that Z-+Infz can be interpreted in Z. And
a completely parallel construction establishes both that Z-+InfNew can be interpreted in
Z-+Infz, and that Z itself can be interpreted in Z-+Infz. Thus it can be concluded that
Z-+InfNew, Z-+Infz and Z are equi-interpretable.
This result provides a comforting response to the question whether Z, or Z -+Infz for
that matter, are still sufficient for the development of ordinary mathematics: They still are;
Z-+InfNew, a theory suited to describe an important fragment of the cumulative hierarchy,
can be interpreted in both Z-+Infz and Z.
Well-foundedness, cumulative structure, and replacement. One foreseeable reaction
to these results is to take, them merely to reveal a common oversight in standard formulations
of the axiom of infinity. After all, Z-+InfNew is a version of Zermelo set theory that proves
that there is a set which contains the null set and it is closed under adjunction, x U {y}.
The interest of Z-+InfNew is that it would seem to prove the existence of all sets of level
< +•w in the cumulative hierarchy, and thus the question immediately arises whether this
theory is sufficient, when cast in second-order terms, to characterize the initial segments of
the cumulative hierarchy indexed by a limit ordinal A > w.
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Of course a prerequisite for a (second-order) theory to characterize a class of initial
segments of the cumulative structure is that it be satisfiable exclusively in models in which
the element-set relation is well-founded. Since the second-order principle of set-theoretic
induction is a theorem of second-order ZF, we may rest assured that second-order ZF is a
candidate to characterize the initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy that are indexed
by some one (uncountable) inaccessible ordinal, as in fact it does. But can we, likewise, rest
assured that second-order Z-+InfNew can only be satisfied in models in which the element-
set relation is well-founded? We could, if we were in a position to derive the second-order
principle of set-theoretic induction as a theorem of second-order Z- + InfNew. Curiously,
however, the answer to our question is negative. Not only can the second-order principle of
set-theoretic induction not be derived from the axioms of second-order Z-+InfNew, one can
even make use of the Rieger-Bernays method' 9 for showing the independence of the axiom
of foundation to construct models of in which the element-set relation is not well-founded. 20
One may be surprised to hear that that there are non-well-founded models of second-
order versions of Zermelo set theory. For recall that these theories come equipped with the
axiom of regularity, which is designed precisely to prevent this situation. It is of course
well-known that in the context of first-order ZF, the axiom of regularity can only prevent
the existence of infinite descending E-chains that are first-order definable in the model. But
the fault for the failure of the axiom of regularity to prevent infinite descending E-chains
that are not definable in the model is often supposed to lie merely in the fact that the
first-order schema of replacement is ill-suited to capture the full content of this axiom.
Much less well-known is the fact that, in the absence of replacement, the axiom of
regularity fails to prevent the existence of infinite descending E-chains which are first-order
definable. And, similarly, one may be surprised to learn that regularity fails, even in the
presence of second-order separation, to prevent the existence of non-well-founded models of
several variants of Zermelo set theory.
Theorem 5. There are non-well-founded models of 2nd-order Z- +JInfNew.
'Cf. (Bernays, 1948) and (Rieger, 1957)
soI am grateful to Vann McGee for asking the question of whether there are non-well-founded models of
second-order variants of Zermelo set theory.
51
CHAPTER 2. MODERN SET THEORY AND REPLACEMENT
Proof. To produce a non-well-founded model M of 2nd order Z-+InfNew, take the domain
of M to be V,+,, and let 7 be a permutation of the domain V,+, defined by:
ir(z) = {{z}}, if x E {Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}}, ...},
r(Zo -x) = Zo - UU,if E Zo - {, {}},
r(Zo - {@}) = {Zo}, and
i(z) = x otherwise.
An informal, but more intuitive characterization of Ir is that it shifts each term forward two
steps in the sequence:
... , Zo - {{{0}}}, Zo - {{0}}, Zo - {0}, Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}}, {{{Zo}}},....
The relation Enewg (V,+, x V,+,) by which the symbol E is to be interpreted in M may
then be defined by: x Enew if and only if x E Ir(y). It is then immediate that Enew is not
well-founded in M, as Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}}, ... are the members of an an infinite descending
Enew-sequence in the model.
We must now see that M is a model of second-order Z-+InfNew. It is routine to verify
that the truth of the axioms of extensionality, null-set, pairing, infinity, and second-order
separation is unaffected by r. The axioms of union, power set, and foundation require more
attention and are discussed here:
Union: Let z be a member of V,+,, and note that it is a consequence of our definition
of a that Vz(z E V,+, -+ rank(x) 5 rank(I(sx)) < rank(z) + 2).2 ' Since ({r(y) : y E
Ir(x)} c VTank(x)+ 2 and Vrank(z)+2 is itself a member of V,{+,, {r(y) : y E r()} E V,+,.
Hence we can infer that U{ir(y) : y E r(x)} is a member of V,+, as well. Now, consider
the set I7r-(U{lr(y) : y E r(z)}) and observe that if z is a member of V,+,, then z Enew
7r-'(U{ir(y) : yE 7r(x)}) just in case z E Fr(y) for y a member of V,+, such that y E ir(x)
- just in case z EnCw y for y a member of V,•, such that y Enew x.
21As usual, rank(z), the mnAk of z, is the least ordinal a such that z V.a. I should emphasize that
this feature of r plays an important role in the proof, for, in general, it is not the case that a one-one
map of V,+ onto V,,+ induces a model of Z-+InfNewr. A permutation that assigns all the finite Zermelo
ordinals to their obvious counterparts in {Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo)},...)} will generate a model in which union fails
- consider tbh union of Zo in such a model. Compare with the Rieger-Bernays method for constructing
non-well-founded models of ZF minus foundation.
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Power. Suppose that x is a member of V,+,, and note that 7r(Z) and P(vr(x)) are members
of V,,,. Observe that if y E P(r(x)), then rank(7r-'(y)) < rank(y) < rank(P(vr(x))).
Therefore, since {r-'(y) : y E P(r(x))} is a member of V,+,, 7r-'({r-(y) : E P(ir(x))})
is a member of V,+, such that if z is a member Mf V,+,, z Enew Ir-1 ({r- 1(y) : y E P(r(x))})
just in case ir(z) C Ir(x) - just in case Vw(w Ene z -> w Enew x), as desired.
Regularity: Case 1. Suppose x E {Zo, {Zo}, {{Z)} },...}. Then, {x} is a Enew-minimal
element of x, since {x} Enew x, but { {x}} new X Case 2. Suppose x = Zo - y with y $ 0.
If y = {0}, then Zo itself is a Ene,-minimal member of x. Else, if y $ {0}, then 0 is a
Enew-minimal member of x. Case 3. Otherwise, Vy E V,+, (y Enew x + y E x). Let y
be a E-minimal element of x. If Ir(y) = y, then y is a Ene-minimal member of x. Else, if
ir(y) $ y, then we distinguish two subcases: (a) y E {Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}},...}. If {y} zx, then
done. Otherwise, let z Ex l {Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}}, ...} such that {z} 0 x - remember that
x E V,+,, and hence cannot contain all the elements of {Zo, { Zo }, { { Zo } }, ...} as members.
Then, z is a Enew-minimal element of x. (b) Else, we have that y = Zo - z for some z E Zo
with z $ 0. If z = {0}, then if Zo E x, proceed as in 1. Otherwise, 0 itself is a Enew-minimal
member of x. E
Thus we conclude that in the absence of replacement, the usual first-order version of
the axiom of regularity fails to insure that the axioms of second-order Z-+InfNew are
never satisfied in non-well-founded models.22 And this result carries over to the second-
order variants of Zermelo set theory discussed thus far as well. More can be said: The
construction of (V,+,, new, n(V+,, x V,,+)) provides us with a model of Z-+InfNew
which falsifies some instances of the usual first-order E-induction schema:
E-induction: 3xB(x) -+ 3x(z(x) A Vy(yQE x -+ --4(y))),
that is: Bx3z(x = {z}) - B x(Bz(x = {z}) AVy(y E x -+ -nBz(y = {z})). Hence we conclude
that, in the absence of replacement, the axiom of regularity cannot exclude the possibility
of there being definable infinite descending E-chains.
aReplacement is not the only axiom whose absence may distort the content of regularity. It is an old
result of Jon Barwise that ZF-Inf cannot insure the existence of the transitive closure of a set. Part of the
interest of Barwise's result is that it can readily be adapted to show that all the axioms of second-order
ZF-Inf can be verified in a model in which the extension of the element-set relation is not well-founded.
53
CHAPTER 2. MODERN SET THEORY AND REPLACEMENT
Perhaps we should have anticipated these results by reflecting on the fact that the
Zermelo axioms are inadequate to prove that every set has a transitive closure, 23 and this
is one of the basic facts used in the standard proof that the axiom of regularity implies all
the instances of the principle of E-induction, modulo the rest of axioms of ZF.
One may now wonder whether Z-+InfNew can be amended to prove all instances of the
axiom schema of E-induction, and, when cast as a second-order theory, to ensure that the
universe is indeed well-founded. Two repairs suggest themselves. One repair that would
achieve the desired result is to adjoin a first-order sentence to the effect that every set
has a transitive closure to the rest of axioms of Z-+InfNew: it is evident that first-order
Z-+InfNew+ "Every set has a transitive closure" proves every instance of the E-schema,
and, in the presence of second-order separation, enforces well-foundedness. The other option
would be to adjoin a restriction of replacement to countable sets to the rest of the axioms of
Z-+InfNew. The result would be considerably stronger than common variants of Zermelo
set theory, and it would prove that prove that every set has a transitive closure as well as
all instances of the axiom schema of E-induction.
There is reason to be dissatisfied with both repairs, though. The axioms of set theory are
ordinarily motivated as a description of the cumulative hierarchy; the axioms of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory enable us to define the V.'s and to prove, as a theorem, that every set x
is included in some V,. In like manner, it would be highly desirable for a variant of Zermelo
set theory to be able to describe and assert the first-order content of the cumulative picture.
Unfortunately, neither Z-+InfNew+-"Every set has a transitive closure" nor the addition
of countable replacement to Z can achieve this.
To realize this, it is sufficient to observe that there are models of second-order versions
of these theories which are not isomorphic to initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy.
In particular, there is a well-known construction of models of set theory which can be used
to establish that there are models of second-order Z-+InfNew+ "Every set has a transitive
closure" which are not isomorphic to initial segments of the cumulative hierarchy: For K an
infinite cardinal, H(Q) is the collection of all sets z whose transitive closure has only sets
23In (Drake, 1974), p. 110-111, Frank Drake exhibits a model of (second-order) Z in which not every set
has a transitive closure.
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of cardinality < K. It is routine to verify that H(r), for an cardinal K > w, satisfies all the
axioms of (second-order) ZFC except possibly power set and replacement. For us, however,
the interest of this construction is that it provides us with a recipe to construct models
of Z-+InfNew that are not of the form (VA, E n(VA x VA)) for a limit ordinal A > w. In
particular, if K is a strong limit, then (H(K), E n(H(K) x H(Q)) is a model of (second-order)
Z-+InfNew+ "Every set has a transitive closure" that is not of the form (VA, E n(V, x VA))
for some limit ordinal A > w.
Other models of second-order versions of Zermelo set theory that are not of the form
(VA, E n(VA x VA)) for a limit ordinal A > w can be obtained merely by taking the basic
closure of a transitive superset of V,.24 Thus for example M(V, U w + w), the basic closure
of V, U w + w, is the domain of another model of second-order Z-+InfNew which contains
w + w, but not V,+, as a member. Now, to obtain a model of Zermelo set theory plus the
axiom of countable replacement that is not isomorphic to an initial segment of the hierarchy,
consider a model such as (H(~ ,), e n(H(f,) x H(l 1 ,)). The interest of this model is
that H(f~1 ) is closed under countable subsets, and thus is a model of Zermelo set theory
plus countable replacement.
The question remains whether there a variant of Zermelo set theory that is equipped
with the resources to describe and assert the first-order content of the cumulative picture.
The answer to this question is affirmative. There is a variation of second-order Zermelo
set theory one of whose axioms explicitely asserts that sets are formed in stages. The first
point to be noticed is that if we take the variables a, f, y, ... to range over von Neumann
ordinals, then the V,'s can be characterized thus:
x = Va * f (Fncf A Dom(f) = a + 1 A VP < a Vy [y E f(P) ++
3A < P (yg C f(A))] A f(a) = x).
This immediately suggests a formulation of the axiom of foundation which can be used to
enforce the modern cumulative view of the set-theoretic universe. This axiom reads:
24As defined in section 2.
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VxBa 3y (y = VA ArC y).
Now consider the theory that results from second-order Z when the axiom of regularity,
Reg, is replaced by the axiom: VxzBay(y = Va A x C y). Then, the distinctions among the
axioms of infinity discussed before collapse, and, the axioms of second order Z +Vx3aBy(y =
Va A z C y) do characterize the Vx's for limit ordinals A > w.
Note first that the (second-order) principle of set-theoretic induction, VX (BxXx -+
[B3xXx A Vy(y E x -+ -Xy)]), is a theorem of the system. (Suppose Xx. Then, Ba Bx(Xx A
x C_ Va), and, by induction on the ordinals, 3/p (3x(Xx A x C Vp) A VA < 3 -'Bx(Xx A x C
VA)). Pick such /3 and x. Then of course, Vy E cz -Xy, since, otherwise, there would be an
ordinal A < p such that Xy A y g VA.)
Theorem 6. M is a model of 2nd-order Z +VzBaBy(y = Vo Az xC y) if and only if M is
of the form (V>, E n(Vx x VA)) for A a limit ordinal greater than w.
Proof Sketch. Suppose M is a model of second-order Z +VxBaBy(y = Va A x C y). By
the (second-order) principle of set-theoretic induction and extensionality, the E-relation
of the model is well-founded and extensional, and, hence, by the Mostowski isomorphism
theorem, M is isomorphic to a transitive E-model. Without loss of generality, let us now
confine attention to transitive E-models of Z +VzBaBy(y = V Arx C y). Suppose M is such
a model, and let A be the least von Neumann ordinal not in the domain. A is a limit ordinal
greater than w, since the model satisfies the axiom of infinity and is closed under successor.
Show that every member of VA is a member of the domain. For every P < A, / is a member
of the domain, and, since VxzaBy(y = V0 A x C y), we have that Vp itself is a member
of the domain. Therefore, since the domain of M is transitive, and VA = U(Vf : / < A),
we conclude that every member of VA is a member of the domain of M. For the converse
inclusion, observe that if z is in the model, then Vrnk(r) is a subset of the domain. But
now, since A is not in the model, neither are the V,'s, for I y > A, subsets of the domain.
And thus, given that Vrank(z) is included in the domain for each z in it, we conclude that
no set of rank > A is in the model. O
One foreseeable source of discontent with second-order Z +VzBaBy(y = Va A x C y)
is that, unlike Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, this theory enforces the cumulative hierarchy
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view by brute force, but it is not a natural extension of the Zermelo axioms. Doubtless,
some will suggest that the moral to be extracted is that replacement may very well be the
only natural principle about sets whose addition to the Zermelo axioms delivers a system of
axioms which contains an implicit description of a cumulative hierarchy of levels or stages.
What is the force of this consideration, however, is a question I shall not pursue here.
2.3 Must we accept (uncountable) replacement?
I think we should be admit that the results presented thus far establish very dramatically
that the presupposition that replacement is rarely used in basic set theory is mistaken.
This is not to deny that there remains an important question to be addressed. Since very
few (albeit significant) of the applications we have considered thus far requires instances
of replacement on uncountable sets (uncountable replacement), it is still legitimate to in-
quire what is the justification for the unrestricted version of replacement that allows for
replacement on uncountable sets, when uncountable replacement is a principle with such
recondite applications outside higher set theory. The remainder of this chapter is devoted
to the discussion of this delicate question.
How evident is the replacement axiom?. One common response to this question is
to remark that replacement, be it replacement on a countable set or on an uncountable
set, is an obvious principle of set construction, an intuitive principle whose self-evidence
outstrips the desirability of itb consequences. I have indicated that what is probably the
reason most theorists accept replacement is that it leads to an attractive theory of ordinals
and permits the incorporation of transfinite recursion into set theory. Some proponents of
this view would even deny that that is the primary reason the axiom is accepted; rather, set
theorists accept replacement because it is a self-evident principle of set construction. In fact,
it is sometimes argued that it is possible to gather some evidence for the self-evidence of
replacement from a careful examination of the history of replacement. For neither Fraenkel
nor Skolem, the first theorists to explicitly formulate the axiom in the context of axiomatic
set theory, seemed to expect replacement to yield all these desirable consequences that
now justify its adoption. And, as a consequence, one might be tempted to conceive of the
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history of the axiom as evidence in support of the view that, regardless of whether or not
replacement is derivable from the iterative conception, it is an obvious principle whose self-
evidence even outstrips the desirability of its consequences.2 5 Indeed, some authors have
in effect suggested that replacement emerged in the 1920s as a self-evident principle of set
construction. As Shaughan Lavine explains in (Lavine, 1994):
It did not take long for Thoralf Skolem and Abraham Fraenkel to note that
Zermelo's axioms while they served Zermelo's purpose of defending his theorem
were missing an important principle of Cantorian set theory - what is now
the Replacement Axiom. The universal agreement that followed is remarkable,
since the axiom wasn't good for anything. That is, at a time when Replacement
was not known to have any consequences about anything except the properties
of the higher reaches of the Cantorian infinite, it was nevertheless immediately
and universally accepted as a correct principle about Cantorian sets.26
The interesting implied suggestion is that the axiom of replacement might have emerged
as a principle of set construction that is evident on the pre-axiomatic concept of set that
underlay Cantor's theory of sets and transfinite numbers. Lavine's picture promotes the
impression that "even today, the self-evidence of replacement outstrips its applications.
We accept it because it is true of the combinatorial notion of set, that is, because it is
self-evident" 27 - an impression that informal expositions of the subject would seem to
reinforce when they suggest that all the axioms of standard set theory can be justified by
appeal to intuitive considerations alone.28
At the outset, let me acknowledge that I have no conclusive argument that will persuade
a defender of Lavine's picture to abandon the view that both Fraenkel and Skolem regarded
replacement as a self-evident principle of set construction. Nor do I intend to deny that
the axiom of replacement enjoys a measure of obviousness or evidence, as is suggested by
the fact that Cantor, Mirimanoff and Hartog had confidently used similar principles of set
25Two extremely useful histories of the axiom is given in (Hallett, 1984) and (Lavine, 1994).
2 (Lavine, 1994), p. 5.
"7Cf. (Lavine, 1994), p. 216.
2 5Lavine's remarks are motivated by the conviction that replacement is evident on a certain conception
of set, the combinatorial conception. Unfortunately, a discussion of Lavine's account of the combinatorial
conception of set is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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construction in proofs long before the axiom was ever explicitly formulated. All I shall offer
are some considerations that make it plausible to suppose that the inability of Zermelo's
1908 axiom system to sanction constructions of countable sets that seemed unobjectionable
from the point of view of pre-axiomatic set theorists may have played an important role in
both Fraenkel and Skolem's respective proposals of the replacement axiom. The ability to
sanction such constructions is, by itself, a significant application of the axiom of replacement
that is not restricted to "the higher reaches of the Cantorian infinite."
As Zermelo states the purpose of his axiomatization of set theory in (Zermelo, 1908), it
appears to have been:
to show how the entire theory created by Cantor and Dedekind can be reduced
to a few definitions and seven principles, or axioms, which appear to be mutually
independent. 2 9
Zermelo's 1908 axiom system, recall, consisted of axioms of extensionality; null set and
pairs; Aussonderungsaxioms, power and union; an axiom of choice; and an axiom of infinity
asserting the existence of Zo. One serious omission from Zermelo's axiomatization is that
Zermelo's axioms do not sanction certain constructions permitted in Cantor's theory of sets
and transfinite numbers. To use the standard example, Zermelo's 1908 are inadequate to
establish that
{Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...}
is a set - where Zo is Zermelo's number sequence and P denotes the power set operation. 30
It is the axiom of replacement that permits this construction in the context of standard set
theory.
However serious, the absence of this and other axioms from Zermelo's 1908 list is perhaps
understandable. One of the principal motives of Zermelo's axiomatization appears to have
2 9(Zermelo, 1908, p. 200).
SOThe results of the preceding section gives us ample evidence for this, and indicate that the inability to
collect {(Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...} is far from being the most dramatic instance of example of a construction
that cannot be carried out in the context of Zermelo's axiom system.
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been to clarify the set existence principles that are used in the course of his 1904 proof
that every set can be well-ordered. Not surprisingly, these are the axioms of separation,
elementary sets, power set, union, and, of course, the axiom of choice.31
Whatever the reason for Zermelo's 1908 omission of replacement, it might be argued
that, by Zermelo's own standards, the axiom fits well with the rest of axioms in Zermelo's
1908 list. One reason for this is that it is often remarked that, for Zermelo, a principle
that is an unexceptionable, well-established part of mathematical practice as it is practiced
elsewhere ought to be accepted in set theory as well. This is an important consideration
in support of the axiom of choice in (Zermelo, 1908a), and it is not difficult to imagine a
similar argument in favor of a restricted form of replacement: since countable sequences
pervade modern analysis and seem routine and benign, set theory, too, ought to sanction
the formation of arbitrary countable sequences. This consideration alone could be used
to motivate a restricted form of replacement according to which one could form arbitrary
countable sets of Zermelo sets.
Unfortunately, no similar consideration would seem sufficient to deliver the full strength
of replacement. 2 For no matter how routine or benign arbitrary countable sequences may
seem, arbitrary uncountable sequences are indeed a novelty and very few results within
ordinary mathematics seem to depend upon their availability, witness the fact that almost
50 years had to elapse since Fraenkel and Skolem first proposed the axiom in order for
a mathematician to isolate an application of replacement on an uncountable set within
ordinary mathematics.33
The other reason one might be tempted to suppose that replacement is in line with
the rest of Zermelo's axioms is that it is sometimes argued that Zermelo's axiomatization is
motivated by a doctrine of limitation of size, and replacement falls rather directly out of the
311t is then no wonder that, as Frank Drake parenthetically remarks in (Drake, 1974), p. 114, Zermelo
had been reported as saying that he forgot to add replacement to his 1908 axiom system; no principle like
replacement is used in the course of Zermelo's 1904 proof that every set can be well-ordered.
321t may be of interest to notice that a perfectly analogous situation would seem to obtain with respect to
the axiom of choice; all classical applications of choice in analysis can be justified on the basis of the much
weaker axiom of dependent choices, and most of them can be sustained with the help of the weaker principle
of countable choice.
SThis is Friedman and Donald Martin's result that replacement is required to establish that every Borel
game is determined. See note 3.
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limitation of size account. Michael Hallett, for example, has claimed that it is fairly clear
that Zermelo accepted the limitation of size hypothesis, and that separation gives partial
expression to that view. Perhaps so, but notice that the thought expressed by separation
is compatible with an interpretation of the limitation of size doctrine based on comprehen-
sion, but not on cardinality: One could identify, first, a collection of unobjectionable, safe
operations to generate new sets from initial sets, and then restrict attention to those sets
that can be "separated" from sets obtained by repeated application of these operations on
certain initial sets, such as the null set or Zo. Zermelo himself outlined a remarkably similar
picture in (Zermelo, 1908a) when he explained that:
if in set theory we confine ourselves to a number of established principles such
as those that constitute the basis of our proof [that every set is well-ordered] -
principles that enable us to form initial sets and to derive new sets from given
ones - then all such contradictions can be avoided.
If we now confine ourselves to sets which can be "separated" from sets obtained from initial
sets by repeated applications of the established principles to which Zermelo referred, then
we will not even be able to sanction the formation of arbitrary countable sequences, much
less uncountable ones. Indeed, as Hallett suggests, it is plausible to attribute this very
interpretation of the limitation of size doctrine to Fraenkel in the mid 20's. Thus I think it
is not clear that replacement falls out of Zermelo's 1908 picture of what sets are.
Nor did Zermelo explain what, exactly, the axioms in his 1908 list were axioms for. As
axioms are ordinarily conceived, they may be supposed to enjoy some preferred epistemo-
logical status deriving from their accordance to some pre-axiomatic concept. One might
have thought, in particular, that there is some pre-axiomatic concept of set that justifies
the adoption of Zermelo's 1908 axioms. Now: Zermelo did not conceive of his axioms as
axioms for the concept of set that underlay Cantor's theory of sets and transfinite num-
bers -in part because he attributed to Cantor the naive concept of set that fell prey to
Russell's paradox. Instead, Zermelo made no claim to have offered an account of what sets
are other than characterizing them as elements of an abstract domain structured by the
element-set relation. Accordingly, it is probably best to think of the Zermelo axioms as
closure conditions imposed on that abstract domain: The axioms of null set and infinity
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ensure that the domain of set theory contains both the null set and Z0 , the Zermelo number
sequence. Other axioms require the domain to be closed under the operations of pairing
{x, y}, union Uzx, and power P(x). Separation, for its part, guarantees that the domain
contains every subset of every set it contains. Even extensionality could be conceived as a
closure condition that requires the domain to contain a witness of every inequality between
two sets, an object that is a member of one but not to the other.
Although Zermelo didn't claim to have offered an intuitive account of the conception
of set he was assuming, he certainly wanted to claim for his axioms that they yield the
theorems of the Cantorian theory of transfinite numbers. This was, after all, one of the
stated aims of the axiomatization. Since, according to Zermelo, Cantor's naive conception
of set had proved bankrupt, Zermelo writes:
There is at this point nothing left for us to do but to proceed in the opposite
direction and, starting from set theory as it is historically given, to seek out
the principles required for establishing this mathematical discipline. (emphasis
added)3
What Abraham Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem would soon question in the 1920s is that
Zermelo's 1908 axioms provided one with all the principles required to accomplish that end.
Abraham Fraenkel (Fraenkel, 1921, 1922) and Thoralf Skolem (Skolem, 1922) independently
observed in the 1920s that "Zermelo's axiom system is not sufficient to provide a foundation
for ordinary set theory."3 5 Fraenkel had already noticed in (Fraenkel, 1921) that Zermelo's
seven axioms were not sufficient to prove the existence of the set {Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...),
and concluded that Zermelo's axiom system could not prove the existence of sets of cardi-
nality N &,.36 Skolem, for his part, raised a more general concern in (Skolem, 1922):
If M is an arbitrary set, it cannot be proved [in Zermelo's system] that M, P M,
p2 M, ... and so forth ad infinitum form a set.37
34(Zermelo, 1908, p. 200).
3 5 (Fraenkel, 1921; 1922). The quote is from (Skolem, 1922, 292).
3 Fraenkel, it should be noticed, might have been assuming the truth of the Generalized Continuum
Hypothesis.
37(Skolem, 1922, p. 296).
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And he even sketched the construction of an inner model of the Zermelo axioms which
excludes the existence of the set {Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...), a set generated from the initial
parameter Zo by repeated application of the power set operation. Skolem's model is given
by:
{ •:3new U" = 0} U{:3nEw3y3mEw(U" =yAU'y = 0}
when the predicate symbol "E" is interpreted to denote the standard element-set relation,
i.e., (V,+,+, En(V,++• x V,+w)). 38
What is worth dwelling on in Skolem's complaint is that the pattern of set construction
to which he is referring is perfectly general and exceedingly simple, since it consists in
the formation of a countable sequence of sets from an initial parameter, Zo, by repeated
application of the power set operation. I have already noticed that the formation of arbitrary
countable sequences pervades ordinary mathematics, and not just the Cantorian theory of
sets and transfinite numbers, and hence the fact that Zermelo's 1908 axioms do not sanction
that construction ought to be regarded as a significant loss.
Other theorists had detected a similar difficulty by 1922. In the abstract of a lecture read
at a session of the 1922 meeting of the American Mathematical Society, (Lennes, 1922), Nels
Johann Lennes claimed that Zermelo's system could not prove "that an arbitrary collection
more than finite in number is a set." Though he published no details, he must have had
examples of countable collections whose existence could not be proved by the 1908 Zermelo
axioms. What this suggests is that Lennes must have called attention to the drawback of
Zermelo's axiomatization just now discussed, and not to a defect concerning the system's
inability to yield the existence of very large cardinals. Lennes proposed to modify Zermelo's
axiomatization "so as to identify as a set any collection of objects having the same cardinal
number as that of some Zermelo set," which is in effect to propose a version of replacement.
All these theorists might have believed that the set {Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...} provides
"the simplest instance of a set whose existence cannot be proved by means of the Zermelo
axioms,"3 9 but the drawbacks of Zermelo's axiomatization are much subtler. For, presum-
"And it is hence not identical with U{w, P(w), P(P(w)),...}, as it is sometimes erroneously said, cf.
(Wang, 1970). HF is a member of the former but not a member of the latter.
"
3 The quote is from (Fraenkel and Bar-Hillel, 1958).
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ably unbeknownst to them, Zermelo's axiom system, and current versions of Zermelo set
theory for that matter, are ill-suited to sanction a variety of apparently unproblematic set-
theoretic constructions. Indeed, the results of the first part provide us with an impressive
catalogue of independence results for both first- and second-order Z+Infz, an immediate
descendant of Zermelo's 1908 axiom system.
I have depicted Zermelo's axiom system in the worst possible light, as a collection of
principles chosen for their apparent consistency and ability to sanction all the set existence
assumptions that underlie Zermelo's proof that every set can be well-ordered, but which
nevertheless fail to yield the existence of exceedingly simple sets, sets that occur at remark-
ably low levels of the cumulative hierarchy. Now: I don't wish to suggest that Fraenkel and
Skolem were aware of all these difficulties, I don't think they were. All I want to suggest
is that it is important to distinguish two different concerns in their respective complaints
that Zermelo's axiom system is insufficient "for the foundation of legitimate set theory."
Whereas Fraenkel's main source of concern, (Fraenkel 1921, 1922), appears to have cer-
tainly derived from the system's inability to secure the existence of specific large sets, sets
of power N,, in (3kolem, 1922), Skolem appears to have been worried about the system's
inability to sanction an apparently unproblematic construction of a denumerable set from
an initial parameter by repeated application of some one Zermelo operation. This fact may
perhaps be obscured by the fact that Skolem's only example involves a set whose union has
cardinality fL,, but, to insist that replacement had in the early 1920s no use other than to
secure the existence of relatively high cardinals is to belittle the fact that replacement was
motivated through the need for specific countable sets that seemed unobjectionable from
the point of view of pre-axiomatic set theorists.
When Fraenkel asserts that "Zermelo's seven axioms are not sufficient for the foundation
of legitimate set theory," he certainly seems to be assuming that a system that is sufficient
for that purpose must, at the very least, provide us with the resources necessary to prove the
existence of sets of power 2 K•. The reason is not difficult to ascertain: K, is a relatively
low cardinal by the lights of Cantor's theory of transfinite numbers, and hence an adequate
axiomatization of set theory ought to be able to reconstruct this aspect of Cantor's theory.40
4oFraenkel's presumption, it should be noticed, is seldom challenged. Most set theorists accept the exis-
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Fraenkel had noticed in (Fraenkel, 1921) that merely extending the axiom of infinity to
assert the existence of the set {Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...} would have rendered the resulting
system vulnerable to more general counterexamples. He concluded the need for a remedy
of a more general character. One year later he would propose the axiom of replacement:
Replacement axiom: If M is a set and if each element of M is replaced by "a
thing of the domain B" then M is transformed into a set.
Undoubtedly, Fraenkel's proposal depends, for it to be acceptable, upon a precise ex-
planation of his picture of replacing the members of a set by objects of the domain. But he
could have done so by making use of an adequate notion of function: If f is a "function"
and m is a set, then {(f() : x E m} (the range of f on m) is a set. Whether or not he was
in 1922 in a position to formulate an adequate version of the axiom is a question I shall
not pursue here, but I should mention that there is some evidence discussed both in Hallett
and Lavine's histories of the axiom to suspect that he was not in such a position.
As for Skolem, he began his attack to Zermelo's system with the observation that "Zer-
melo's axiom system is not sufficient to provide a complete foundation of the usual theory
of sets."41 And he quickly pointed out to the system's inability to sanction the construction
of a set from an initial parameter M by repeated application of the power set operation.
Perhaps unbeknownst to him, Skolem's point can be strengthened considerably: it can be
proved as a theorem of ZF that if M is an infinite set of level w in the cumulative hierarchy
such that M N Zo E HF, then M is not a member of Z, and thus its existence is not
provable in the context of Zermelo's axioms.4 2 w is a prominent example of such a set, but
tence of higher transfinite cardinals as a matter of course, and part of the reason is that their existence can
be proved in standard (Zermelo-Faenkel) set theory; indeed, that is often supposed to be one of the virtues
of the system. It is only recently, (Boolos, 1998), that someone has argued that it is a perfectly sensible
view to hold both to doubt the truth of theorems concerning the higher infinite that are provable in ZF and
to regard theorems concerning sufficiently low levels of the cumulative hierarchy as unquestionably true.
1'(Skolem, 1922). The emphasis is mine.
"
2Thus: M obviously is a member of
M = U{M, P(M), P(P((M)),...},
but M n Z c HF. The latter fact is proved by a simple induction. By hypothesis, M n Zo E HF.
Suppose now that ;P(M) n P"(Zo) E HF. Then, since P~"+~'(M) n P"+'(Zo) = P(P"(M) n P"(Zo)) and
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notice that w is a set which can be obtained from the null set by repeated application of the
von Neumann successor operation, x U {x}. Likewise, it should be obvious how to use the
former observation to obtain further sets which can be constructed from an initial param-
eter by repeated operation of some Zermelo operation but whose existence is independent
from Zermelo's 1908 axiom system.
It would probably be a mistake to attribute too much generality to Skolem's remarks,
but the point remains that the pattern of set construction to which he calls attention is
both perfectly general and exceedingly simple. Thus, it can still be argued that he motivates
replacement as a repair to a serious shortcoming of Zermelo's 1908 axiomatization that is
not restricted to the higher reaches of the Cantorian infinite.
In contrast to Fraenkel's remedy, Skolem's repair to Zermelo's axiom system was quite
precise and much closer to the standard schematic version of the axiom:
In order to remove this deficiency of the axiom system we could introduce the
following axiom:
Let U be a definite proposition that holds for certain pairs (a,b) in the domain
B; assume, further, that for every a there exists at most one b such that U is
true. Then as a ranges over the elements of a set Ma, b ranges over all elements
of a set Mb.43
In the context of his paper, "a definite proposition that holds for certain pairs (a,b) in
the domain B" is just a well-formed formula of the language of set theory. Accordingly,
he offered a general procedure for obtainingK a formula sufficient to prove the existence of
{M, P(M), P(P(M)), ...} for an arbitrary Zermelo set M.
Neither Fraenkel nor Skolem advocated the addition of replacement to Zermelo's system,
neither commented on whether they conceived of replacement as a self-evident, or to a cer-
tain extent obvious principle, or even on whether they thought their remedies to systematize
prior practices. This much is certain. Skolem expressed some caution in the formulation
of his repair to Zermelo's axiomatization; he just claimed that "in order to remove this
P"(M) n P"(Zo) E HF, we have that 'P+'(M) P"+'(Zo) E HF, too. Compare with Lemma 1 above.
a (Skolem, 1922).
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deficiency of the axiom system we could introduce the following axiom."44 Such caution
suggests that their emendation to Zermelo'a axiomatization had a tentative character not
to be neglected. As for Fraenkel, he would soon refer to the axiom of replacement as:
an axiom proposed by me as a stopgap, an axiom which nevertheless would seem
to be too sweeping to be called upon without a painstaking investigation of its
necessity.45
Michael Hallett cites some evidence (albeit inconclusive) to suggest that Fraenkel even
regarded replacement as a suspicious principle. In 1926, he described the axiom as an
"unpleasant far reaching axiom," and he often referred to the "special" sets that the axiom
generated as "very comprehensive, sets."46 The interest of this denomination is that it
suggests that replacement may have conflicted with Fraenkel's own interpretation of the
limitation of size doctrine according to which only collections that are bounded by - or
subsets of - some Zermelo set can form sets.47
Whatever the source of Fraenkel's reluctance to accept the axiom of replacement, he did
not accept the necessity of the axiom for the purposes of general set theory, and, at least
up to 1958, he continued to regard the theory of ordinals and the theory of cardinals > N,,
as "special set theory." For example, in (Fraenkel, 1927), he writes:
... general set theory can be derived in its full extent from the axioms I-VII, the
Zermelo axioms."4
Curiously, however, (Fraenkel, 1927) contains a generalization of Zermelo's axiom of in-
finity which is provably equivalent to a restriction of replacement to countable sets. Roughly
speaking, Fraenkel's generalization of the axiom of infinity states that for every set x and
every function F, there is a set y which contains x and contains F(z) whenever it contains z.
4(Skolem, 1922). The emphasis is mine.
S(Fraenkel, 1925), p. 251. The emphasis is mine.
"(Fraenkel, 1926), p. 131.
47(Hallett, 1984).
"Cf. (Fraenkel, 1927). p. 139. The translation is Hallett's.
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The interest of this fact is that it suggests that Fraenkel may have regarded the formation
of arbitrary countable sets as part of general set theory, too.49
Lavine's interpretation of the early history of the axiom seems to rest on the presuppo-
sition that the mere addition of sets of cardinality > R,, rather exotic objects, would not
seem sufficient to explain the widespread acceptance of the axiom that followed Fraenkel
and Skolem's respective proposals. Thus, in (Lavine, 1994), he repeats:
Replacement received no historical justification as a systematization of prior
practice or the like: the fact that its applications are so recondite shows that it
had to do little with prior practice. The application of replacement came only
after its acceptance. Both Fraenkel and Skolem saw that replacement was a
self-evident principle concerning combinatorial collections before von Neumann
discovered that the axiom was good for something and even before they were
convinced of the utility of combinatorial collections."
And yet, motivating the axiom of replacement as a repair designed to sanction an appar-
ently unproblematic procedure for constructing new countable sets from an initial parameter
and a Zermelo operation is significant, and renders replacement a new generator in the Zer-
melian setting, and, in particular, as a remedy to an important drawback of Zermelo's
axiomatization that is not restricted to the "higher reaches of the Cantorian infinite."
Ordinals and replacement. I have suggested that both Fraenkel and Skolem had moti-
vated their respective proposals of replacement as a repair designed to generate countable
sets like {Zo, P(Zo), P(P(Zo)), ...}, whose existence seemed unobjectionable from the point
of view of pre-axiomatic set theory. However, it was only von Neumann's discovery of his
theory of ordinals and the formalization of transfinite recursion, let alone its proof, that
required the full exercise of the axiom of replacement. Neither Fraenkel nor Skolem seemed
to expect replacement to yield these desirable consequences, and some authors, Michael
4 9(Bernays, 1942) contains a discussion of Fraenkel's variant of the axiom of infinity and its relation to
the claim that every countable class is a set. An important part of Bernays' article is also devoted to show
that the result of adjoining the latter claim to the Zermelo axioms is sufficient for the development of a vast
part of modern analysis.
so(Lavine, 1994), p.2 1 6 .
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Hallett for example, have credited John von Neumann, and not Fraenkel or Skolem, with
the discovery of the axiom.51
John von Neumann published the details of his theory of ordinals in 1923, but, as a letter
to Zermelo of 15 August 1923 indicates, by then, he had already developed his own axiom-
atization of set theory, which contained a form of replacement. As von Neumann would
later comment on the system, "Fraenkel's replacement axiom is added. This (among other
things) is necessary for the setting up of the theory of ordinal numbers."5 2 Nevertheless, von
Neumann's treatment of ordinal numbers did not depend on the special characteristics of
his axiomatization, and could, according to him, be embedded in Zermelo's axiomatization
provided only that this is supplemented with the axiom of replacement.
As von Neumann indicates in (von Neumann, 1923a), his theory is intended to impose
a specific form on the set representatives of the ordinal numbers: "Every ordinal is the
set of the ordinals that precede it." To be quite specific, von Neumann defined for each
well-ordered set (X, <) a "numeration" of X to be a function f on x such that for all x in
X f(x) = {f(y) : y < x}. And he then identified the ordinal number of the well-ordered
set (X, <) with the range of the numeration f on X:
If X 1, 2, X3, and X4 are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th elements of x, respectively,
then clearly for every numeration f(x) of X we have
f (x) = 0,
f( 2) =0 },
f(x4) = {0, {0}, {0, {0}}}
consequently, if X has 0, 1, 2, or 3 elements, its ordinal is, respectively,
(0),
{0, {0}}, or
{0, {0}, {0, {0}}}
One important respect in which von Neumann's theory requires the full strength of
replacement is that, without it, it cannot be proved that every well-ordered set has a
5
"' (Hallett, 1984), ch. 8.
5 2(von Neumann, 1923b).
69
CHAPTER 2. MODERN SET THEORY AND REPLACEMENT
numeration: in the absence of countable replacement, it is not even possible to prove the
existence of a numeration for (Zo, E), i. e. w; absent a more general form of replacement,
it is not even possible to prove the existence of a numeration for (1P(Zo), <) where < is a
well-ordering of P(Zo). Replacement is tailor-made for that purpose; with the aid of the
replacement axiom, von Neumann could establish the existence of a numeration for each
well-ordered set (X, <), and he then identified the ordinal number of a well-ordered set
(X, <) with the range of a numeration f on X. In addition, he established both the existence
of a unique ordinal for each well-ordered set, and the fact that isomorphic well-ordered sets
receive the same (von Neumann) ordinal number. The other important respect in which von
Neumann's theory of ordinals relies on the axiom of replacement is that it is replacement
that is required to justify definitions by transfinite recursion, and these seem indispensable
for the definition of operations of ordinal addition and multiplication in complete generality,
of which more shortly. Indeed, even though von Neumann never explicitly advocated the
incorporation of replacement into Zermelo's system, he nevertheless explained that "in fact,
I believe that no theory of ordinals is possible at all without this [replacement] axiom."53
There is no question that the von Neumann theory of ordinals requires the full exercise
of replacement, but this is yet a far cry from the claim that no theory of ordinals is possible
in the absence of replacement. Perhaps von Neumann assumed that in order for a theory
of ordinals to be satisfactory, it must be such that it assigns ordinals to well-ordered sets in
a process that depends on the set of previous assignments to the successive initial segments
of the set. But to be able to form the set of previous assignments invariably requires one
form of replacement or another. For example, as ordinals are assigned to well-ordered sets
in von Neumann's theory, the ordinal assigned to a well-ordered set coincides with the set
of previous assignments to initial segments of the set. This requires, of course, successive
availability of the set of previous assignments to the different initial segments of the well-
ordered set, which can only be guaranteed by a form of replacement.
Now: it may justifiably be doubted that the requirement to form the ordinal of a well-
ordered set in a process of the sort just outlined is a necessary condition for a theory of
53 (von Neumann, 1925).
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ordinals to be satisfactory. Instead, it is arguable that all is required for a theory of ordinals
to be adequate is that there be a definable functional relation, ord, that associates with
each well-ordered set (X, <) a set representative, ord((X, <)), but such that ord((X, <
)) = ord((Y, <)), whenever (X, <) and (Y, <) are isomorphic structures. Is replacement
necessary to ensure the existence of such a definable functional relation? It may be of
interest to note is that one cannot hope to prove the answer to be affirmative. To realize
this, it is enough to recall G6del's observation that (Lx•,, E n(Lm, x Lt,)) is a model of
Zermelo set theory plus the existence of a definable well-ordering of the universe. For then,
one can use the definable well-ordering of LM, to define a functional relation that associates
with each well-ordered set (X, <) in LH, the least structure that is isomorphic to it.54
Not only can it not be proved that replacement is required for the existence of an
adequate theory of ordinals, there is an attractive approach to the theory of ordinals due to
Dana Scott that need not rest upon the availability of replacement. Scott devised a general
method of definition that permitted him, for example, to rescue the Fregean treatment of
cardinal numbers for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory; in particular, he showed how to define
the cardinal number of a set as the set of sets equinumerous with it of least rank. And,
similarly, he showed how to define the ordinal of a well-ordered set as the set of well-ordered
sets isomorphic to it of least rank.
However, Scott's technique depends upon set-theoretic facts which are ordinarily es-
tablished with the aid of the axiom of replacement. For example, one ordinarily uses the
replacement to justify the method of transfinite recursion on the ordinals, and then to define
the Va's, and to prove a theorem to the effect that every set is a subset of some Va. Once
this theorem is in place, it is possible to define the rank of a set, z, as the least ordinal a
such that x C_ V, and, more importantly, for the definition of the Scott ordinal of a well-
ordered set (X, <) as the set of all well-ordered sets (Y, <) of least rank that are isomorphic
to (X, <).
Despite appearances to the contrary, replacement is not strictly required to prove that
every set is formed at some level of a cumulative hierarchy (JU Va. For recall that the theory
"I am indebted to Vann McGee for this example. Other limit ordinals A > w would do as well.
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Z +Vz3aBy(y = V As z C y), where "y = Va" abbreviates:
3f(Fnc(f) A Dom(f) = a + 1 A Vfl < a Vy4y E ff(P) ++ 3A < P (y C f(A))] A f(a) = X).
Now, this theory may undoubtedly seem ad hoc or unnatural as a version of Zermelo set
theory, but it certainly provides us with a setting in which Scott's plan can be carried out
without incident.
A more natural presentation of set theory that would serve the same purpose is due to
Richard Montague and Dana Scott, who developed an axiomatization of set theory designed
to enforce the cumulative picture that dispenses with replacement entirely. Instead, they
started with the notion of "partial universe" as primitive and showed how a remarkably
simple set of axioms for sets and partial universes is sufficient to assert the first-order
content of the picture of the set-theoretic universe as a cumulative hierarchy of stages or
"partial universes." Scott, in particular, moved to a two-sorted language with variables
x, y, z... for sets, and variables V, V', ... for partial universes, and produced axioms
governing them. 55 The axioms of Scott's theory are those of extensionality and separation,
an accumulation axiom,
Accumulation: VVxz(a E V ++ VV'(V' E V A V' V x C V)),
which makes sure that the members of a level are the members and subsets of previous
levels (the levels are ordered by the element-set relation), and an axiom of restriction,
Restriction: Vx3V x C V,
which states that every set is included in some level. It can be shown that all the axioms
of Zermelo set theory except for choice and infinity follow from these axioms alone. From
our point of view, however, the principal interest of the Scott axioms is that they allow us
to formulate a variant of Zermelo set theory that captures the cumulative hierarchy view
of the set-theoretic universe. To obtain such a theory, it is enough to adjoin to the Scott
axioms a suitable axiom of infinity asserting the existence of a limit stage.
"sThe move to a two-sorted language is just a matter of convenience; (Potter, 1990) for example contains
a development of Scott's axiomatization in the standard one-sorted language of set theory.
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The development of 3cott's theory of ordinals is now routine. Since Scott's axiom of
restriction permits one to prove that every set x is a subset of some level V, one can define
V(x) as the E-least level V such that x is a subset of V. And then we can define the Scott
ordinal of (X, <) as the set of well-ordered sets (Y, <) of E-least level. In addition, it is now
possible to define the usual operations of ordinal sum, multiplication, and exponentiation
without appeal to the general method of transfinite recursion. 56
To summarize, even though von Neumann's theory of ordinals and the development of
transfinite recursion undoubtedly supplies us with compelling reasons to accept replacement,
the beginnings of an alternative theory are available to someone who may still be reluctant
to accept the axiom.
Transfinite recursion. The other important development in modern set theory that re-
quires unrestricted replacement is the method of definition by transfinite recursion. Though
the method of transfinite recursion on a well-founded relation is perfectly general, it will
be enough for present purposes to consider the case of E, the element-set relation. One
formulation of transfinite recursion that uses first-order variables for classes states that,
given a class A, perhaps a proper class, that is, a class that is not a set, if G : A x V -+ V
is a functional relation, then there is a unique functional relation F : A -+ V such that for
each x in the class A:
F(x) = G(x, F[{y E A : y E ),
where Fr{y E M : y E x} = {F(y) : y E M A y E x}. When the transfinite recursion
theorem is reworded in the usual manner to avoid reference to classes in favor of reference to
formulas, we obtain a theorem schema of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, and a useful theorem
schema, too. The schema of transfinite recursion may be viewed as a schema for introducing
defined functions; given a functional term 'F(x, y)' implicitly defined by the recursion, the
transfinite recursion schema states that we can explicitly define it by constructing a formula
of the language of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory that defines a functional relation that satisfies
the recursion clause.
"Michael Potter has developed the theory in detail in (Potter, 1990).
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Now, the interesting question is whether the general method of definition by transfinite
recursion can be sustained in the absence of replacement. Two potential difficulties present
themselves. One is the possible inability of different versions of Zermelo set theory to
ensure existence; what guarantee do the Zermelo axioms provide that, given a definition
by transfinite E-recursion, there is a functional relation that satisfies the recursion? The
other is their possible inability to ensure uniqueness; what guarantee do they provide that,
if there is a functional relation satisfying the recursion, then there is no other such relation?
One place in which one makes essential use of replacement is in the proof that, given
a transfinite definition of a functional relation on a class, there is a functional relation
satisfying the recursion which is defined on all of the members of the class. In view of the
results of the first part of the chapter, we can see that, quite often, the axioms of all the
different versions of Zermelo set theory will not be able to ensure that, given a definition
by transfinite recursion on a class, there is a functional relation defined on all the members
of the class, and which satisfies the recursion clause. To illustrate this situation, consider
the following definition by transfinite recursion on On, the class of all the ordinals:
Va = U{PVs : 3 < a},
and recall that none of the variants of Zermelo set theory we have considered have the
resources to justify the existence of a functional relation which both satisfies the recursion
and is defined for all the ordinals; some of them cannot prove the existence of V,, none
of them can prove that if a limit ordinal A exists, then so does V, exist. This situation is
not alleviated by the addition of what we have called countable replacement. To obtain
a model of Zermelo set theory plus countable replacement in which there is no functional
relation satisfying the recursion, consider the structure (H(:.,), E n(H(Z1,) x H(fl,)).
This structure is a model of Zermelo set theory plus countable replacement which contains
wl as a member, but which does not contain V,,, a set of cardinality 1,,.
It is an intriguing question whether the axioms of Zermelo set theory have the resources
to prevent more radical failures of existence, perhaps due to the existence of definable
infinite descending E-sequences. 5 7 The standard proof of the existence of a functional
57The fact that the infinite descending E-sequences we found in models of Zermelo set theory are definable
is crucial. The mere fact that there are non-well-founded models of (first-order) Zermelo-Fraenkel set is no
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relation introduced by transfinite recursion on a certain class constructs the functional
relation from approximations on initial (E-)segments of the class satisfying the recursion,
which can be shown to exist by appeal to the principle of E-foundation and replacement.
Now: given the fact that the principle of E-induction fails in certain models of Zermelo set
theory, the intriguing possibility emerges of a class none of whose members is in the domain
of a partial function satisfying the recursion. 58
What the existence of models of Zermelo set theory with definable infinite descending
E-sequences can be used to establish is that, given a definition by transfinite recursion,
the axioms of Zermelo set theory cannot guarantee the uniqueness of a functional relation
satisfying the recursion. To that purpose, we can simply use the construction (V,+w, Enew
n(v,,, x V,,+,)) of Theorem 5. For recall that this is a model in which the sets Zo, {Zo},
{ {Zo}}, ... form a (definable) infinite descending Ene,-sequence of members of V,+,. Now:
given the functional relation y = {x}, take a simple definition by transfinite recursion on
the members of the infinite descending Enew-sequence Zo, {Zo}, { {Zo } },...
F(x) = {F[{y E {Zo, {Zo}, {{Zo}}, ...} : y E x}},
This rveursion is supposed to define a functional relation on the class {Zo, {Zo},{ {Zo})},...}
which assigns to each member of the sequence the unit, according to Eew, of whatever it
assigned to its immediate E.,w-predecessor - observe that, again according to Enew, each
member of the sequence has a unique predecessor. The trouble is that little manipulation
ought to convince us that F1 and F2 are two different functional relations that satisfy the
recursion clause:
FI(x) = x. (Thas: Fi(Zo) = Zo, F-({Zo}) = {Zo}, F({{.Zo})) = {Zo,...
F2 (x) = Ux. (Thus: F2(Zo) = {Zo}, F2 ({Zo})= { {Zo}}, ). )
Surely if F1 is the identity function restricted to the members of the sequence Zo, {Zo},
{{Zo}}, ..., then it satisfies the recursion; it assigns to each member of the sequence the
unit set, according to Enew, of what it assigned to its immediate Enew-predecessor, that is,
obstacle for us to be able to use transfinite recursion, for all these models are models of all of the instances
of the pinciple of E-induction, too.
5s8 t is not obvious, for example, that, given a definable infinite E-descending sequence, one can show
that there is a functional relation, rk, defined on the members of the sequence which satisfies the recursion:
rk(z = U{rk(y)+ 1: y E .
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it assigns to it the unit set of its predecessor. But, similarly, if F2 is the functional relation
that assigns to each member of the sequence its Enew-immediate predecessor, then it also
assigns to each member of the sequence the unit set of what it assigned to its immediate
Ene,-predecessor, that is, it assigns 6o it the unit set of the immediate En,,,-predecessor of
its Enew-predecessor, which is no other than its immediate Ene,-predecessor.
The moral seems inescapable: as they stand, common versions of Zermelo set theory are
inadequate to sanction the general method of definition by transfinite recursion. Neverthe-
less, it is not difficult to think of possible repairs one could use to remedy this situation.
What is required for the usual proof of uniqueness to ensure that, given a definition by
transfinite recursion, if there is a functional relation satisfying the recursion, then it is
unique is the derivability of all instances of the principle of E-induction. But this could be
achieved by the adoption, for example, of an axiom asserting the existence of the transitive
closure of every set, or, perhaps less economically, by the adoption of countable replacement.
The full exercise of replacement would still be required to ensure that, given a definition
by transfinite recursion on a class, there is a functional relation which both satisfies the
recursion and is defined on all the members of the class, and this should be admitted as
further evidence in favor of the replacement axiom.
2.4 Conclusion
I have argued that it is a mistake to regard replacement as a mere closure postulate on the
ordinal levels of the cumulative structure with few or no applications within the first w + w
levels of the cumulative hierarchy. In contrast with this picture, a picture of replacement
has emerged as a principle of set construction which is required even to ensure that the cu-
mulation of sets described by the axioms of set theory reaches the stage w in the cumulative
hierarchy. And we have seen that there are other important, often neglected applications
of replacement are required at remarkably low levels of the cumulative hierarchy. Most of
these involve instances of replacement on a countable set, and may not seem to provide
us with compelling reasons to accept the full force of replacement. What they establish,
however, is that it would be ill-advised to abandon the axiom in the absence of a suitable
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replacement.
Even after the claim that the applications of replacement are rare and exotic has been
corrected, the question remains of why we should accept replacement in its unrestricted
form, that is, replacement be it replacement on a countable set ot on an uncountable set,
when its applications on uncountable sets still seem recondite. I have argued that the best
case for replacement comes not from intuitive considerations about the concept of set, but
rather from the fact that, in its absence, it is no longer possible to develop von Neumann's
theory of ordinals, and, more importantly perhaps, the fact that the general method of
transfinite recursion is no longer sustained. With transfinite recursion in place, one is in
a position to describe and assert the content of the modern cumulative view of the set-
theoretic universe, and, even though this can be indirectly be accomplished without appeal
to replacement, it is plausible to suppose that no other natural addition to the axioms of
Zermelo set theory achieves this. Though, in the end, these may not be conclusive reasons
to in favor of replacement, they certainly show that it cannot be abandoned without a
significant cost.
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Chapter 3
A No-Class Theory of Classes
In the present chapter we shall be concerned with the in the plural: the inhab-
itants of London, the sons of rich men, and so on. In other words, we shall be
concerned with classes.
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 181.
3.1 Introduction
George Boolos (Boolos, 1984, 1985) developed a plural interpretation of second-order set
theory. Boolos observed that plural quantification does not require a separate specification
of the range of plural variables once the range of individual variables has been specified, and
exploited this feature to argue that, if we identify second-order quantification with plural
quantification, then we can both let the first-order variables of the language of second-order
set theory range over all the sets there are and insist that there need not be a separate
domain of second-order entities over which the second-order variables of the language range.
In this chapter, we shall make use of the apparatus of plural quantification to interpret
both two- and one-sorted first-order impredicative theories of classes, much in the spirit
of a suggestion of Richard Cartwright in (Cartwright, 1998). We are going to see that a
plural interpretation of impredicative theories of classes has a number of advantages over
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other, more traditional accounts of the set-class distinction, and that it provides us with
the machinery necessary to carry out recent, important developments in contemporary set
theory.
Much very important and very interesting work in set theory in the last two decades
has been concerned with large cardinals that have been characterized in model-theoretic
terms that are not directly formalizable in the language of standard set theory, by which I
mean, as usual, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the axiom of choice (ZFC). Most of these
cardinals are supposed to be the least ordinal moved by a certain injective map other than
the trivial identity map of the universe of all sets, V, into some transitive E-model, M, of
ZFC with On C M (an inner model of ZFC) that preserves first-order formulas - x, ...,
x, satisfy the first-order formula (xl, ... , xn) if and only if their images j(x 1), ..., j(zn)
satisfy i(vl, ..., vn) in M. The stronger the closure conditions imposed on the inner model,
the stronger the corresponding large cardinal principle.
Now, one difficulty with large cardinal hypotheses asserting the existence of such cardi-
nals is that their direct formalizability both upon the formalizability of the relation of class
satisfaction for formulas of the language of ZFC, which is not quite formalizable in ZFC
on account of Tarski's result on the undefinability of truth, and the existential assertion
of a class that is not a set, a map j of V into some inner model of ZFC. To be sure, if
the principal impediment for the formalizability of such statements consisted merely in the
undefinability of the class satisfaction relation, then perhaps we could enrich the language
of ZFC with a new, implicitly defined satisfaction predicate, and then proceed to formalize
the necessary model-theoretic concepts in terms of that predicate. Surely we could, but
a more persistent problem would remain. For the enriched language would still lack the
resources necessary to assert the existence of class that is not set, such as a map j of the
universe V into some inner model of ZFC.
The move to an impredicative theory of classes like Morse-Kelley set theory (MK) sug-
gests itself. For MK provides us with the resources necessary to directly formalize the class
satisfaction relation for the formulas of ZFC and to make existential assertions of the desired
sort. This theory is often formulated in a two-sorted, first-order language, L, with lower-
case variables, z, y, z, ... for sets, and uppercase variables X, Y, Z, ... for classes. This
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language, C, contains a two-place predicate letter, "E," read: "is a member of."' There are
two axioms that are concerned with classes:
Class Extensionality: Vz(x E X * z E Y) -+ X = Y
Impredicative Comprehension: 3XVxz( E X E)
where 4 is a formula in which the variable 'X' does not occur free. Two other axioms of
the Morse-Kelley system are:
Separation: VXVxzyVz(z E y +* z E z A z E X),
and
Replacement: VX(X is a function -+ Vz3yVz(z E y ++ 3w(w E x A (w, z) E X))).
The rest of the axioms of MK coincide with their counterparts in ZFC.
Now, MK is both a theory suited to formalize the relation of ciass satisfaction for formu-
las of ZFC and a theory with the resources necessary to assert the existence of impredicative
classes of the desired sort. Nevertheless, it should be noted that MK is a theory strictly
stronger than ZFC; not only does MK formalize the relation of class satisfaction for for-
mulas of ZFC, it even proves that there is such a class as the class of (Gbdel codes of)
true formulas of ZFC. Therefore, MK proves tho consistency of ZFC, and thus is not a
conservative extension of ZFC.
Before I comment on the difficulties involved in the interpretation of a theory like MK,
let me briefly mention that another set theory that encompasses sets and classes is Gbdel-
Bernays set theory (GB), the theory that results from MK when the axiom schema of
impredicative comprehension is weakened to:
Predicative Comprehension: 3XVz(x E X ++ 4)
1This is just a matter of convenience, since the theory could be formalized in a one-sorted language with
variables for classes just as well.
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where q is a formula in which no class variables are quantified. All of the theorenms of ZFC
are the Ims of GB, but in addition, GB is a conservative extension of ZFC: if q is a formula
of ZFC that is a theorem of GB, then 0 is a theorem of ZFC as well. For if M is a model
of ZFC that is a model of -- , then it is not difficult to expand it into a model GB that
is a model of -nq with exactly the same sets.
It is not uncommon for set theorists who make use of predicative classes to take comfort
in the fact that a predicative theory like GB is a conservative extension of ZFC. For, they
reason, even if classes are regarded as a valuable heuristic resource, the fact remains that
predicative classes are ultimately dispensable for purposes of establishing set-theoretic facts
that are formalizable in standard set theory. The problem with this view, however, is that
we are often interested in facts which are not directly formalizable in standard set theory.
For one example, most of the large cardinal hypotheses we have just mentioned involve the
existence of elementary embeddings which are not quite definable as the range of a formula
6(x, y) of the language of ZFC.
3.2 The trouble with classes
Both Morse-Kelley (MK) and Godel-Bernays (GB) set theories are first-order interpreted
theories; their lowercase, or set variables of the language are supposed to range over all
sets, and a formula "x E y" is taken to be true (relative to an assignment of values to the
variables) just in case the set assigned to the variable 'x' is a member of the set assigned
to the variable 'y'. The trouble is that, in order to complete the interpretation, we need to
specify both the range of the uppercase, or class variables of the language and the conditions
under which a formula "x E Y" is to be evaluated as true relative to an assignment of values
to the variables. This is the general problem we are going to discuss in this chapter.
The first point to be noticed is that the range of the uppercase, or class variables of the
language must be different from the range of the lowercase, or set variables of the language;
by predicative comprehension, the sets that are not members of themselves are the members
of a class, but they cannot be members of a set on pain of contradiction - we will use the
term "proper class" to refer to those classes that are not sets. In other words, set theories
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that encompass both sets and classes must distinguish certain classes, proper classes, from
sets.
This need not be a problem, provided that we interpret the lowercase, or set variables
of the language to range over the members of some set - perhaps even one of the form
V, for some suitable ordinal K. For then, we could just interpret the class variables of
the language to range over the power set of the set over which the set variables range -
V,,+, - V, in the case in which the set variables of the language are taken to range over
V,. The problem I would like us to confront in this chapter arises when we take the set
variables of the language to range over all the sets there are. For it is only then that we are
forced to confront the question of what are (proper) classes, if not sets.
A common picture of the set-class distinction is that, while sets are collections - where
the term "collection" is used in a generic fashion to refer to entities that may do duty for
sets and classes - that are formed combinatorially from their elements in the cumulative
hierarchy, proper classes are collections that are "too big" to form sets. Thus, it is often
remarked that the distinction between sets and proper classes is motivated by a distinction
between two different conceptions of collection. According to a "combinatorial" conception
of collection, collections are combinatorially formed from their elements.2 According to a
"logical" conception of collection, the characte istic mark of a collection is there is a logical
collection that corresponds to each partition of the universe into two categories depending
on whether objects are members of it or not. The combinatorial conception of a collection
is sometimes supposed to underlie the picture of sets as formed in levels or stages of the
cumulative hierarchy, and thus set theory is often viewed as the most comprehensive theory
of combinatorial collections. It is, for example, in terms of this contrast that it is often
explained that, while Frege and Russell were profoundly disturbed by the set-theoretic
antinomies, Cantor remained unmoved by them.
2This is admittedly vague, as different theorists use the label "combinatorial" differently. A number
theorists, most notably Penelope Maddy, use the term "combinatorial collection" to refer to sets formed
in the cumulative hierarchy, but other theorists are at pains to insist that the notion of "combinatorial
collection," which can presumably be traced to Cantor, is independent from the iterative conception of set,
which can be argued to have played no role in the development of set theory until the late 1940s. However,
even if this distinction is made, it is still plausible to suppose that the iterative conception presupposes the
notion of combinatorial collection, and thus to think of iterative sets as a species of combinatorial collections.
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There are important differences between the two conceptions of collection. For one, log-
ical collections are often supposed to be more enccmpassing than combinatorial collections:
no combinatorial collection contains all collections, but there certainly is a logical collection
of all collections. And yet, according to some accounts of the distinction, 3 there is another
respect in which combinatorial collections are more encompassing than logical collections.
For example, there are, on these accounts, more combinatorial collections of natural num-
bers than there are logical collections of them. And the reason for this is that, on these
accounts, a logical collection exists only as the extension of a predicate, and there are com-
binatorial collections - or sets - of natural numbers whose members are the extension of
no predicate.
Another difference is that, if objects, logical collections would seem eligible to be mem-
/bers of themselves. Thus, for example, since the logical collection of all infinite collections
is itself infinite, it must be a member of itself. And yet, since combinatorial collections are
combinatorially formed from their elements, which must be given in advance, no combina-
torial collection can contain itself as a member.
But what is perhaps the most important difference between combinatorial collections
and logical collections is that the assumption that logical collections are objects gives rise to
the set-theoretic antinomies. Russell's paradox arises from the assumption that there is such
an object as the logical collection of non-self-membered collections. Mirimanoff's paradox
arises from the assumption that there is a logical collection of well-founded collections, and
the Burali-Forti paradox arises from the assumption that there is a collection of all ordinals.
As a result, though the combinatorial conception of collection may be supposed to provide
us with a motivation to regard set theory as the most comprehensive theory of combinatorial
collections, the problem arises whether there is an intelligible and coherent account of the
notion of logical collection that may help us provide an account of the set-class distinction.
The problem is not all that urgent as far as predicative theories of classes are concerned;
in practice, since the axiom of comprehension of GB doesn't require the existence of classes
other than those which are determined by first-order formulas with quantifiers that range
'For example those in (Maddy, 1990) and in (Lavine, 1994).
86
CHAPTER 3. A NO-CLASS THEORY OF CLASSES
over sets, its classes are often treated via circumlocution in the metatheory. The situation
is entirely different in the case of impredicative theories of classes. In MK, for example,
there are classes that are dletermined by formulas with quantifiers that range over classes,
and thus we must deal with the question of what exactly the items class variables range
over are.
Before I comment on what is perhaps the most common solution to this problem, let
me stress that the difficulty under consideration arises exclusively on the, otherwise entirely
reasonable, assumption that we can quantify over all sets. For example, it is not a problem
for those who adopt the point of view, which Ernst Zermelo hinted at in (Zermelo, 1930) and
Charles Parsons subsequently developed in (Parsons, 1974), according to which the phrase
"all sets" is hopelessly ambiguous: whenever we use it, we quantify not over all the sets
there are but only over the members of a certain set - presumably a V., for a sufficiently
large K. The advantage of this view is that there remains a mitigated sense in which proper
classes can be reduced to sets. For there is, according to Parsons, a "higher" perspective
from which what we regard as proper classes are sets which happen to fall outside the scope
of our quantifiers from the original perspective. For present purposes, however, we will
simply assume that we manage to quantify over all sets there are, and hence that proper
classes cannot be reduced to sets even in the manner suggested by Parsons. 4
A much more common reaction to the difficulty that concerns us is to admit that we
can indeed quantify over all the sets there are, but to posit, in addition to the existence
of sets, the existence of additional gigantic set-like entities, only too encompassing to be
sets. Classes are then supposed to form an additional layer of the cumulative hierarchy:
For example, if V is V, for K an inaccessible, then some theorists conceive of the classes of
MK as indistinguishable from what would be an additional layer of sets, V,+1 - V,.
What is perhaps the most serious difficulty with this response is that, once we conceive
of proper classes as gigantic set-like objects, only too encompassing to be sets, then we have
to concede that not even the theory of classes can be the most comprehensive theory of
4(Parsons, 1977) combines a relativistic view of the set-theoretic quantifiers with the thought that the
distinction between sets and classes can be explained in terms of the different intensional principles they
satisfy. Unfotunately, a discussion of Parsons' account is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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collections. For just as the sets that are not members of themselves can be collected into
a class, there is no reason to suppose that the classes that are not members of themselves
cannot be collected into some other set-like entity, a super-class perhaps. Thus there must
be a theory of super-classes some of whose variables range over these new set-like entities.
But surely there is no reason to stop there: it must be possible to collect the super-classes
that do not belong to themselves into a new sort of set-like entity, a hyper-class, .... And
the result of course is an iteratively-generated hierarchy of class-theoretic universes at the
bottom of which lie the sets recognized by set theories like ZFC. Though perfectly coherent,
this is a view that strikes one as unstable, and certainly not preferable to a view of classes
that is compatible with the view that regards set theory as the most comprehensive theory
of set-like entities.
3.3 Plural quantification and classes
A crucial, but tacit assumption in the statement of the difficulty is that reference to classes
is to be construed either as singular reference to objects of one sort or another, or else
as illusory. According to this common assumption, set theorists who speak of the class of
all ordinals, On, or of the class of all sets, V, for that matter, must either be taken to
refer to gigantic set-like containers that are only too large to be sets or else such talk must
not be taken literally. Yet, as Richard Cartwright has recently suggested in (Cartwright,
1998), another, often neglected alternative is to construe reference to classes not as singular
reference to gigantic set-like entities other than sets, but as plural reference to sets. Thus,
set theorists who speak of the class of all ordinals, On, may be taken to refer not to
some gigantic ordinal-container, but rather to refer to the ordinals themselves in disguised
notation. The aim of this chapter is to exploit the resources of plural quantification and
plural reference to develop this suggestion in detail. Plural quantification, in the sense of
(Boolos, 1984), provides us with the resources necessary to simulate "logical collections,"
and to nevertheless maintain that set theory is the most comprehensive theory of set-like
entities, and not merely those lying at the bottom of a certain hierarchy of class-theoretic
universes. The proposal we shall consider consists in the interpretation of each first-order
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formula of a theory of classes with class variables in it as a plural assertion about sets. To
that purpose, we will need to resort to the apparatus of plural quantification. We shall need
plural pronouns (variables), a plural predicate to link singulars with plurals: "is one of,"
and a plural quantifier: "There are zero or more," as explained in (Boolos, 1984).
What I would like to do now is to argue that this apparatus supplies us with the resources
necessary to simulate "logical collections" and thus provide an attractive interpretation of
impredicative theories of classes in which set variables are taken to range over all sets there
are. To that purpose, I take my cue from recent comments on Cantor's explanation of the
concept of set by Richard Cartwright. In a recent paper (Cartwright, 1998), commenting on
Cantor's explanation of the concept of set, he suggests that we can make sense of Cantor's
concept of an inconsistent multiplicity (collection) by taking the truth of:
(1) There are some sets that are such that no one of them is a member of itself and
such that every set that is not a member of itself is one of them,
to be enough for there to be a collection of sets that are not members of themselves -
enough, that is, for the truth of the sentence:
(2) There is a collection of sets such that no one of them is a member of itself and
such that every set that is not a member of itself is one of them.
It is important to observe that the truth of (1) is all it is required for the use of the
plural description "The non-self-membered sets" to be legitimate. Then, the thought is that
perhaps we can take the use of the term "collection," in (2), to be merely a device to refer in
the singular to what is perhaps more usual to refer to in the plural: the non-self-membered
sets. This move will permit us to maintain that there are no set-like entities other than sets
and to nevertheless admit the truth of (2). In fact, unless we take the truth of (2) not to
require the existence of a set-like entity which encompasses all the non-self-membered sets,
we will be forced to conclude that (2) is false.
When the term "collection" is construed as a mere device to refer in the singular to what
can otherwise be referred in the plural, it would seem that, as Richard Cartwright has put
it, "a collection of so-and- sos, in Cantor's sense, : nothing over and above the so-and-sos
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it consists of."5 And this is the proposal I want to consider here: to conceive of classes, be
them proper or improper, as collections - or pluralities - of sets, which are nothing over
and above the sets they consist of.
I should note that the idea that we construe the term "collection" as a purely singu-
larizing device is not entirely new, as it is explicitly elaborated in (Cartwright, 1993) and
it certainly echoes Bertrand Russell's "classes as many," as contrasted with what he calls
"classes as one" in The Principles of Mathematics.6
An important consequence of Cartwright's proposal is that, in this purely singularizing
use of the term "collection," no collection is a set.7 This represents a departure from the
use of the term "collection" by virtually all theorists as a generic term used to refer to
entities that may do duty for sets and classes, but I, for one, know of no better account of
the distinction between logical and combinatorial collections.
Notice that, even on this singularizing use of the term "collection," we can still make
sense of the distinction between logical and combinatorial collections as a distinction that,
for example, classifies some sets as a logical collection just in case they are all and only
those sets that fall under one side of a certain partition of the universe. And, similarly, we
can still say that some sets form a combinatorial collection just in case there is a stage of
the cumulative hierarchy at which they all occur simultaneously.
The other important difference between sets and collections, in Cartwright's sense, is
that, while sets are obviously members of other sets, collections cannot enter into the
element-set relation, which is a relation which takes two unmistakably singular arguments:
the planets of the solar system are a collection, but, as there is more than one of them,
they cannot be a member of a set. And, likewise, no object can be a member of them -
even though, of course, an object may be one of them. No matter: even if sets are to be
5Cf. (Cartwright, 1998), p. 16.
"Helen Cartwright writes that "collection," in this use, "serves only to singularize a plural nominal."
Russell's distinction appears in (Russell, 1903), pp. 68-69. Of special interest for purposes of the present
discussion is Russell's suggestion that "it is correct to infer an ultimate distinction between a class as many
and a class as one, to hold that the many are only many, and are not also one" on p. 76.
7Modulo the concern that if x is a set, then (the collection which consists of) the sets that are identical
with z would seem to be indistinguishable from the set x itself - even though not, of course, from the
singleton of z.
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distinguished from collections, in Cartwright's sense, it is evident that every set bears an
intimate relation to the collection of its members; to use a phrase of Paul Bernays, every set
represents a collection -- in the sense that the members of the set are precisely the objects
each of which is one of the collection.
From the point of view we have espoused here, only "combinatorial" collections, that is,
collections that are coextensive with sets formed in the cumulative hierarchy, are represented
by a set. No other collection, such as for example the collection of all sets, is represented
by a set. And thus, there remains an important sense in which set theory is the most
comprehensive theory of "combinatorial collections." But now, an important part of the
interest of the point of view under consideration is that logical collections are no longer
problematic: it is a truism that, given a division of the set-theoretic universe into two
parts, there is a collection of all and only those sets on each part. Thus, what is perhaps
the most salient difference between logical and combinatorial collections is that, unlike
combinatorial collections, not every logical collection is represented by a set.8
The proposal I want to explore now is the suggestion that we conceive of "logical col-
lections," or classes, as collections, in Cartwright's sense, and that, when the range of the
set variables of the language of the theory of classes are taken to range over all sets, we
construe the class variables of the language as plural variables that range over collections,
in Richard Cartwright's sense, of sets. The principal advantage of this interpretation is that
it does not require a separate specification of the range of class variables after all - hence
the name "no-class theory of classes."
A plural interpretation of two-sorted Morse-Kelley set theory. The plan now is to
develop a plural interpretation of a two-sorted, first-order Morse-Kelley theory of classes.
This interpretation will treat the lowercase, or set variables of the language to range over
the domain of all sets, but will treat the uppercase, or class variables of the language as
plural variables that range over that domain. The class quantifier "3X" will be treated as a
5Logical collections are no longer problematic, but it may be protested that sets, objects allegedly rep-
resenting collections become somewhat mysterious. Perhaps so, but this is just a version of the traditional
metaphysical problem of understanding the relation a set bears to its members; what the distinction between
sets and collections, in Cartwright's sense, does is to highlight an existent problem, not to generate one.
Thanks are due here to Richard Cartwright.
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plural quantifier in the spirit of (Boolos, 1984); that is, if 4* is the result of substituting an
occurrence of "--x = x" for each occurrence of "x E X" in k, a formula of two-sorted MK,
then a formula of the form "3X#" of two-sorted MK is interpreted to be true if and only
if either there are some sets that are such that 4 or r*. To complete the interpretation,
we must now specify the conditions under which all the different atomic formulas of the
language ofi two-sorted MK are to be interpreted as true relative to a suitable assignment
of values to the variables that occur in them.
This problem reduces to the problem of specifying the conditions under which each
formula of the form "z E y" and "x E Y" is to be interpreted as true relative to a suitable
assignment of values to the variables that occur in them. For the two place predicate 'e',
is, in primitive notation, never flanked by another combination of set and class variables.
Formulas of the form "x E Y" and "X E Y" are later introduced to abbreviate, respectively,
the formula By(Vz(z E y ++ z E Y)Ay E x) and the formula 3x(Vz(z E x - z E X)Ax E Y).
The conditions under which formulas of the form "x E y" and "x E Y" are taken as
true relative to an assignment of values to its variables are given by two clauses:
(i) A formula "x E y" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables if
and only if the set assigned to the variable 'x' is a member of the set assigned to
the variable 'y'.
(ii) A formula "x E Y" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables if
and only if the set assigned to the variable 'x' is one of the sets assigned to the
plural variable 'Y'.
Abbreviate "3y(Vz(z E y ++ z E Y)" as "y represents Y," that is, a set, z, represents a
class, Y, just in case "z is the set of exactly those sets which are such that a set x is one of
them just in case x is one of the Ys." Or, a bit less verbosely, "Y consists of exactly those
sets that are members of z." Two immediate consequences of (i) and (ii) are:
(iii) A formula "Y E x" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables just
in case the sets assigned to the plural variable 'Y' are represented by a member of
the set assigned to the variable 'z',
(iv) A formula "X e Y" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables just
in case the sets assigned to the plural variable 'X' are represented by one of the
sets assigned to the plural variable 'Y'.
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One technical point deserves mention: on the plural interpretation just given, the symbol
"=" can no longer be taken to denote the identity relation when flanked by class variables.
Identity is a relation between individuals, i.e., the relation an individual bears to itself and
to no other individual. But if we construe talk of classes as plural talk of sets in disguised
notation, we should not expect classes, or collections in Cartwright's sense, to enter into the
identity relation. This is not much of a loss, since, on the plural interpretation just given,
we can still treat the axiom of class extensionality:
Class Extensionality: Vx(x E X + x E Y) ++ X = Y
as a definition of the symbol '=', which, in primitive notation, will disappear, except when
flanked by lowercase, or set variables. Now, the fact that we use the symbol '=' indicates
that we are committed to the usual requirements of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and
substitutivity, by which I mean, as usual, the schema: X = Y -+ q(X) + qS(Y). In primitive
notation, however, all the atomic formulas in which class variables appear are of the form
"x E Y," and thus we can rest assured that all instances of substitutivity will be derivable
from class extensionality in combination with definitions of "X E y" and "X E Y."
The axiom of impredicative comprehension of the Morse-Kelley system:
Impredicative Comprehension: 3XVx(x E X 4 4(x)),
where 4 is a formula not containing X free, will now be true just in case: either there is
no set x such that O(x) or there are some sets Xs such that a set x is one of the Xs if and
only if O(x). This should strike as a logical truth; if false, it would be the case that there
is a set x such that O(x), but there would be no sets Xs such that a set x is one of the Xs
just in case q(x), and that just could not be.
As for the other two axioms of two-sorted MK with uppercase, or class variables, the
axiom of separation,
Separation: VXVx3yVz(z E y 4 z E x A z e X),
will, on the plural interpretation, be true just in case: given certain sets Xs, if x is a set,
then there is a set y whose members are exactly those members of ax which are one of the
Xs. And the axiom of replacement,
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Replacement: VX(X is a function -+ Vx3yVz(z E y ++ 3w(w E x A (w, z) E X))).
will now read: given certain ordered pairs Xs no two of which differ in their second compo-
nent but not in their first component, if z is a set, there is a set, y, of exactly those sets that
appear as a second component of one of the Xs with a member of x as a first component.
Thus, on the plural interpretation now developed, the strength of these axioms amounts to
that of their counterparts in second-order set theory.
The remaining axioms of Morse-Kelley set theory will of course retain their customary
reading. This completes the plural interpretation of the two-sorted version of the Morse-
Kelley system, an interpretation that takes the lowercase, or set variables of the language
to range over all sets there are, and takes the uppercase, or class variables of the language
to be plural variables that range ove'; the domain of all sets, too. We have interpreted the
two-place predicate "E" to denote a relation we have defined in terms of the element-set
relation and the relation "is one of," that is, the relation (i) a set bears to another just in
case it is a member of it, (ii) a set bears to certain sets just in case it is one of them, (iii)
certain sets bear to another set just in case they are represented by some member of the
set, and, finally, (iv) certain sets bear to certain other sets just in case the former sets are
represented by one of the latter sets.
Effective as it is when the domain is taken to encompass all the sets there are, it is
important to note that the plural interpretation of two-sorted MK is not forced upon us in
circumstances in which the domain of the interpretation constitutes a set. For example, if
the domain of the lowercase variables is V, for a suitable n, then it is open to us to take the
uppercase variables of the language to be individual variables that range over the members
of V,+1.
This set-thro retic interpretation is, in the appropriate sense, isomorphic to the plural
interpretation which takes the set variables of the language to range over the members of V,.
Both interpretations coincide in the range they assign to the set variables of the language
as well as in their interpretation of the symbol 'E' when flanked by set variables. Now, to
each z E V,+1, a set in the range of the class variables on the set-theoretic interpretation,
there corresponds a collection, in Cartwright's sense, of members of z, which is in the range
of the class variables on the plural interpretation. Finally, a value of a set variable on the
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set-theoretic interpretation bears the interpretation of the symbol 'E' to a value of a class
variable on the set-theoretic interpretation just in case the former is a member of the latter,
that is, just in case the value of that variable on the plural interpretation is one of the sets
which correspond to the latter on the plural interpretation. 9
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the mere fact that we have provided an
alternative interpretation of the formalism doesn't change the fact that the underlying logic
of two-sorted MK, as most theorists conceive of it, is the standard predicate calculus. That
is, the range of theorems delivered by the logic of MK will remain unchanged even after we
provide a solution to the problem of specifying an interpretation of the formalism that lets
us take the set variables of the system to range over all sets. The fact remains, in particular,
that the theory is satisfied in a variety of countable models of different sorts. None of these
models interpret the formulas of first-order MK in terms of plurals, but some of them bear
witness to important facts concerning the deductive resources of the theory, as they indicate
that a variety of class-theoretic statements are not provable from the axioms of MK in the
context of the standard first-order predicate calculus.
A plural interpretation of one-sorted Morse-Kelley set theory. Thus far we have
developed an interpretation of a version of the Morse-Kelley system in which there are
two different sorts of variables, variables for sets and variables for classes. This notation
is convenient, but it disguises the fact that the underlying logic of the theory is the first-
order predicate calculus. A more perspicuous notation uses only lowercase variables as class
variables, and distinguishes sets from classes by the fact that the former but not the latter
satisfy the formula "3y z E y." A prominent example is developed in the appendix of
Kelley's General Topology, a one-sorted, first-order theory whose variables are interpreted
to range over classes. I now want to suggest that we can provide a plural interpretation of
Kelley's presentation of the theory of classes.
To that purpose, it would have probably been enough to realize that each formula
BTo make this perfectly precise would require us to code a "function" from the range of the class variables
of the set-theoretic interpretation to the range of class variables of the plural interpretation as a relation
that correlates a set in the range of the class variables of the set-theoretic interpretation to exactly those
sets that the "function" is supposed to assign to them. The reason for this is that, presumably, no functions
may take collections, in Cartwright's sense, as arguments or values.
95
CHAPTER 3. A NO-CLASS THEORY OF CLASSES
of Kelley's one-sorted presentation of MK translates into an equivalent formula in of the
standard two-sorted version of MK. To each formula of Kelley's theory of the form "x E
y" there corresponds a formula of the form "A E Y" of two-sorted MK, which in turn
abbreviates: 3x(Vz(z E x + z E X) A x E Y), another formula of two-sorteq MK. Thus, we
are in a position to make use of the plural interpretation of two-sorted MK to generate a
plural interpretation of Kelley's theory.
This plural interpretation would treat all the lowercase variables of the theory as plural
variables that range over the domain of all sets. The existential quantifier "9x" would
similarly be treated as a plural quantifier, read: "There are zero or more," and the symbol
"E" will be treated as a two-place predicate letter that denotes a relation certain sets bear
to certain other sets if and only if the former are represented by one of the latter sets. The
result of this interpretation would take a formula of Kelley's one-sorted version of MK as
true relative to an assignment of values to the plural variables of the formula if and only
if its counterpart in two-sorted MK is true relative to that assignment. Thus, a formula
"x E y" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables if and only if the formula
"X E Y" of two-sorted MK, or, equivalently, the formula "3x(Vz(z E x z E X) Ax E Y)"
of two-sorted MK, is interpreted as true relative to that assignment to its plural variables.
Otherwise put, we have that:
A formula "x E y" is true relative to an assignment of values to the variables if
and only if the sets assigned to the plural variable 'x' are represented by one of
the sets assigned to the plural variable 'y'.
Then, just as Kelley introduces the predicate "is a set," we can introduce a new predi-
cate, "is represented," into the language of Kelley's theory by means of the explicit defini-
tion:
x is represented if and only if By E y.o10
This predicate is now used not to distinguish sets from classes but to distinguish classes
that are represented by sets in the domain from classes that are not so represented. After
'oThe departure from Kelley's terminology is due to the fact that, in general, classes must be distinguished
from sets, as we take talk of classes as plural talk about sets in disguised notation.
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this distinction is made, we are still able to rephrase all our assertions about sets as assertions
about classes that are represented by a set in the domain. Thus, on the plural interpretation
explored in this section, the theory of classes becomes a theory of representation.
One point to be noticed is that, on its plural interpretation, Kelley's axiom of class
extensionality, Vz(z E x z E y) ++ x = y, would need to be strengthened in order
for it to serve as a definition of the symbol "=." The reason we would like the axiom
of class extensionality to serve as a definition of that symbol is again that, on the plural
interpretation we have developed, "=" cannot be taken to denote the identity relation, which
is a relation between individuals, but not a relation between collections, in Cartwright's
sense. The trouble with treating Kelley's axiom of class extensionality as a definition,
however, is that it would not guarantee the derivability of all instances of substitutivity,
which is the schema: x = y -+ 4(x) ++ 0(y). What we can do instead is to strengthen
Kelley's axiom of class extensionality to:
Class Extensionality: Vz((z E x ++ z E y) A (x E z ++ y E z)) ++ x = y,
an axiom which can in fact be used to prove each instance of the substitutivity schema.
It may now seem far from evident that the rest of the axioms of Kelley's one-sorted
system are verified when interpreted in plural terms. For example, consider Kelley's axiom
of impredicative comprehension:
Impredicative Comprehension: 3xVy(y is represented -+ (y E x +S (y)')
where q is a formula which does not contain x. I think it should be admitted that it is
not obvious that, on its plural interpretation, this schema adequately expresses the content
of the axiom of impredicative comprehension. And, in fact, it may even be wondered
whether all instances of this schema are true. To convince oneself of the truth of the plural
interpretation of impredicative comprehension, one may start by considering the plural
interpretation of its counterp;art in two-sorted MK:
3XVY(3yVz(z E y + z E Y) -+ (3yVz(z E y 4 z e Y) A y •e X (Y))).
For consider what needs to be the case for it to be true: either there are no sets Ys which
both are represented and satisfy q or, otherwise, there are some sets Xs which are such
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that, given certain sets Ys if a set y represents the Ys, then y is one of the Xs if and only
if the Ys satisfy 4, that is, O(Y).
To return now to Kelley's one-sorted system, it will be useful for present purposes to
treat a class abstract of the form "{x : x is represented A q(x) }" as a plural term referring
to exactly those sets representing sets xs which are such that W(x). 11 With this stipulation
in place, we can rephrase the content of Kelley's axiom as: given a formula 4, there are some
sets xs such that a set is one of the xs just in case it is one of {y : yrepresented A 0(y)},
or there are no sets ys such that 4(y). Or, in the singular, given a formula 4, there is a
collection, in Cartwright's sense, {y : yrepresented A 0(y)}, which consists of exactly those
sets representing a collection y such that 0(y), or there is no collection y such that 0(y).
And this should strike as a logical truth, too: either there are no sets ys which are both
represented and such that 0(y), or there are some sets xs such that a set is one of the xs if
and only if it represents some sets ys, which are such that 0(y). 12
As for the rest of the axioms of the theory, Kelley's axiom of subsets:
Subsets: If x is represented, then there is a y such that it is represented and for each z,
if Vw(w E z -+ w E x), then z E y,13
is now interpreted: If the xs are represented, then there are some ys which are represented
by a set and such that a set is one of the ys just in case it represents some zs such that a
set is one of the zs just in case it is one of the xs. Or, in the singular, if x is a collection, in
Cartwright's sense, that is represented by a set then there is a collection y that is represented
by a set and such that every set representing a collection z which consists exclusively of
members of x is one of the sets y consists of.
"This stipulation is quite useful in the general case, but it is not entirely adequate. For consider a class
abstract of the form ({ : x is represented A I). This would correspond to the plural description: "The sets
representing sets xs such that I," which would not seem to refer. This should not be a source of major
concern, however, as class abstracts will disappear in primitive notation.
"2A curiosity: once one realizes that all the instances of comprehension strike as logical truths, one may
reflect that the second-order closure of the impredicative comprehension axiom schema strikes as a logical
truth, too, which would be fine except for the little detail that, on the plural interpretation we have advanced
here, it does not make sense.
13In set-theoretic terms, Kelley's axiom of subsets asserts the existence of a superset of the powerset of a
set.
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An immediate consequence of Kelley's axiom of subsets is a version of the axiom of
separation of set theory: if x is represented, and z is a subcollection of x, i.e., for each
w E z, w E x, then z is represented, too. The reason is that if x is represented, then, by the
axiom of subsets, there is a collection, y that is represented and such that z E y. Therefore,
z is represented, too.
Abbreviate: {y : y is represented A y = x} by: {x}. 14 Then, another consequence of
the axiom of subsets is that if x is represented, then {x} is represented, too. For if x is
represented, then {y : y is represented A Vz(z E y -+ z E x)} is represented and it is the
case that Vz(z E {x} -+ {y : y is represented A Vz(z E y -+ z E X)}).15
As for the rest of axioms of Kelley's presentation, they can now be formulated:
Union: If x is represented and y is represented, so is x U y
where "x U y" is taken to refer to the collection {z : z E x V z E y}, i.e., the collection
consisting of exactly those sets that represent a collection which is represented by a set
which is either one of the sets x consists of or one of the sets y consists of.
Substitution: If f is a function and the domain of f is represented, then the range of f
is represented.
Amalgamation If x is represented, then {z : 3w(z E w A w E z)} is represented, too.
Regularity: If x $ 0, then there is a class y such that y E z A Vz(z E y -+ --z E ).
Infinity: There is a class y which is represented and such that 0 E y and Vz(x E y -
xU { xE} y).
Even Kelley's axiom of global choice is verified on the plural interpretation we have
developed. Kelley's axiom of global choice:
"As defined by class extensionality, when flanked by plural variables, the symbol "=" doesn't refer to the
identity relation but to the relation certain members of the domain bear to certain other members of the
domain just in case a set is one of the former just in case it is one of the latter sets.
'
5 One could abbreviate {z : x represented A z z} by: 0, and then attempt to prove from Kelley's axiom
of subsets that, if a class x is represented, then so is 0. However, the interpretation of this term presents
problems of its own, and it is better to formulate and prove this theorem in primitive notation, where no
class abstracts occur. Similar remarks apply to the rest of the axioms Kelley formulates with the help of
class abstracts.
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Global Choice: There is a choice function f whose domain is V - {0}
reads: there are some ordered pairs fs which are such that if x $ 0 and the xs are represented
by a set, then there are ys such that x E y - the ys are represented by one of the xs -
and (x, y) is one of the fs, and, given some zs such that x E y, (s, z) is one of the fs iff
y = z. And this, again, should strike one as true.
This should convince us that we are in a position to develop the theory of classes just as
Kelley does in the appendix of General Topology. What we have done is to argue that there
is a perfectly coherent and intelligible interpretation of the theory on which the domain of
(plural) quantification is taken to be the domain of all sets; all we have done is to take the
variables of the theory as plural variables that range over that domain, and to interpret the
predicate "E" to denote the relation (a collection of) certain sets bear to (a collection of)
certain other sets just in case the former sets are represented by one of the latter sets.
Alternatively, if we want to interpret the theory of classes with respect to a domain
that constitutes a set, then we can take the class variables of the theory to range over
subsets of the domain and we can interpret the predicate "E" to denote the standard
element-set relation and the predicate "is represented" to refer to all and only those subsets
of the domain that are members of the domain. Indeed, since the underlying logic of
Kelley's theory is still the standard first-order predicate calculus, we would expect there
to be countable and other set-sized models that bear witness to the fact that a variety of
statements are not theorems of.Kelley's system.
Plural quantification and first-order set theories. A pleasant feature of the plural
interpretation of the theory of classes is that it highlights a distinction to be made between
two different roles plural variables play in the plural interpretation of impredicative theories
of classes:
(i) Plural variables permit us to obtain an unexceptionable interpretation of the (un-
restricted) comprehension schema.
(ii) Plural variables permit us to obtain strengthened interpretations of the axioms
of separation and replacement of set theory that are immune to the expressive
limitations of their first-order counterparts.
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In the plural interpretation of second-order set theory, this distinction is obscured by
the fact that plural variables only occur in the formulation of the axioms of separation
and replacement. What I would like to do now is to suggest that this distinction is best
appreciated when we consider the theories of classes that result when both the axioms of
class extensionality and impredicative comprehension are adjoined to first-order theories
such as ZFC; on the plural interpretation of such theories, plural variables are used merely
to simulate "logical collections," but not to formulate strengthened versions of the axioms
of separation and replacement.
For example, suppose the axioms of class extensionality and impredicative comprehen-
sion is adjoined to the axioms of first-order ZFC, call the two-sorted theory that results
ZFCc. The advantage of the plural interpretation we have advanced is that it is imme-
diate to realize that ZFCc is a conservative extension of ZFC. Both theories agree on the
sentences in their common jurisdiction, and no set-theoretic fact that is not provable in
ZFC is provable in ZFCc. The reason for this is that, on the plural interpretation under
consideration, the axiom of impredicative comprehension is, again, a logical truth: either
there is no object x such that q(x) or else there are some objects such that an object x is
one of them just in case O(x). Therefore, if M is a model of ZFC, then M is obviously
a model of ZFCC, too. And, conversely, if M is a model of ZFCc, then M is trivially a
model of ZFC.
It may nevertheless be useful to consider such impredicative, conservative extensions
of first-order set theories just because they come equipped with the resources necessary to
formalize many assertions ordinarily assumed to require impredicative classes, such as for
example reflection principles, on which more later.
3.4 Substitutional quantification and predicative classes
Thus far we have advanced a plural interpretation of the Morse-Kelley system, an impred-
icative theory of classes. The question now immediately arises whether it is possible to
specify a plural interpretation of some variant of the weaker Gidel-Bernays system that
distinguishes it from Morse-Kelley set theory. Now, there is one respect in which a plural
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interpretation of the axioms of separation and replacement of GB would be unsatisfying.
For, on their plural interpretation, the axioms of separation and replacement of GB col-
lapse into the axioms of separation and replacement of MK, and thus, as they would be
satisfied in exactly the same models, the distinction between GB and MK would become a
distinction without a difference.
Fortunately, we are not necessarily required to regard the restricted quantifier of GB
as plural. An alternative interpretation of the class variables that appear in the axioms of
separation and replacement of GB treats them as substitutional variables that range over a
specific set of formulas of first-order ZFC. As a matter of fact, substitutional interpretations
of predicative theories of classes have been developed by W.V.O. Quine (Quine, 1974) and
by Charles Parsons (Parsons, 1975).
To obtain a substitutional interpretation of GB, we begin with the stipulation that
whenever O(x) is a formula of the language of first-order ZFC with exactly one free variable,
we rewrite 0(t) as: t E {xz: (x)}. We now take X, Y, ... to be variables that range over
expressions of the form {x : (sx)} for b(s) a formula of first-order ZFC, and define X = Y
as: Vx(x E X ~+ x E Y). And, finally, we introduce the substitutional quantifier FlX,
which ranges over formulas of the language of first-order ZFC with one free variable. Now,
on the substitutional interpretation a sentence of the form lXP(X) is true if and only if
all sentences gotten from the schema O(X) when "X" is substituted by an expression of
the form {x : q(x)}, for (4x) a formula of first-order ZFC with exactly one free variable,
are true.
Thus, for example, the axiom of separation of GB can now be written:
flXVxzyVz(z E y + z E zAz E X),
which will be true just in case all sentences obtained by substituting a term of the form
{z : •(x)}, where k(x) is a formula of first-order ZFC with exactly one free variable, for
"LX" in the formula VzB3yVz(z E y 4 z E x A z E X) are true.
It is evident that the strength of the substitutional versions of the axioms of separation
and replacement of GB approximates that of their schematic counterparts in first-order
ZFC, but, unfortunately, they don't quite match it. For, given our account of substitutional
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quantification, the only formulas of ZFC in the substitution class are formulas containing
exactly one free variable, but not formulas containing additioual free variables or parameters.
Charles Parsons (Parsons, 1971) devised a generalization of substitutional quantification
that can be used to accommodate these formulas too. The thought is that, given the usual
definition of satisfaction for the formulas of first-order ZFC, we can stipulate that a sequence
s satisfies a formula of the form [IXu(X) if and only if s satisfies every formula obtained
by substituting a term of the form {x : q(x, yl,...,yj)}, where q(x, yl,...,yn) is a formula
of first-order ZFC containing variables yl, ... , yn free, for "X" in 0/. This generalization of
substitutional quantification, which is discussed by Charles Parsons both in (Parsons, 1971)
and in (Parsons, 1974), gives us precisely what we wanted: an interpretation of GB that
sits well with the view that there are no set-like entities other than sets.
It may be of interest to mention that, since, on the substitutional interpretation, GB
is satisfied in every model of first-order ZFC, the contrast between the plural and the
substitutional interpretations of GB would seem to reflect the contrast between first- and
second-order ZFC.
Unfortunately, the substitutional interpretation of the class quantifiers is not available
for the purpose of interpreting impredicative theories of classes, such as, for example, the
Morse-Kelley theory. First off, it should be obvious that a substitutional interpretation of
the class quantifiers on which a class variable "X" is supposed to range over expressions
of the form {x : q(x)}, where O(x) is a formula of ZFC, will inevitably fail to verify all
the instances of the impredicative comprehension schema of the Morse-Kelley theory. The
reason is quite simple. For notice, for example, that the class of (G6del codes of) true
formulas of ZFC can be defined as the extension of a formula of the form "ZX S(X, x),"
where S(X, x) contains no class variables other than "X." But then, since:
EXVx(x E X ZEX S(X,x))
is an instance of impredicative comprehension, and, by Tarski's theorem on the undefin-
ability of truth, there is no class abstract of the form {x : q(z)}, where q(s) is a formula of
the language of ZFC, that is coextensive with ZX S(X, z), we have that the substitutional
interpretation just proposed cannot verify all the axioms of Morse-Kelley set theory.
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It will perhaps be suggested that we need only refine the interpretation by allowing sub-
stitutions of a class variable "X" by expressions of the form { : O(x)} in which 4(x) is not
necessarily a formula of ZFC, but perhaps a formula that contains itself the substitutional
quantifier [IX. But now, think what might happen. A sentence of the form fIX4(X) is
supposed to derive its truth conditions from the truth conditions of its instances, but the
substitution instances of that sentence need not be simpler than the sentence itself. And
thus its evaluation may lead us into circularities. 16
To illustrate this point, let us expand the language of two-sorted MK to contain class
abstracts of the form {x : O(x)), where O(x) is a formula of the larguage of MK, and take
the class quantifier of MK to be substitutional. Now consider a sentence like:
flX(3x(x E X) -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y E x - y E X))).
Whether or not this sentence is true depends on whether all the substitution instances of
"3x(x e X) -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y E x -+ -y E X))" are true. All the substitution instances
of this sentence are unproblematically true except perhaps for the ones that result when
"X" is substituted for a class abstract that contains the substitutional quantifier HX. For
let "A(x)" abbreviate: "-iIX(x E X -+ 3x(x E X - Vy(y E x -+ -y E X)))," and
consider:
3x(x E {x : A(x)}) -+ 3x(x E {x : A(x)} AVy(y Ex -+ -y E {y : A(y)})).
If we decide that "HX(3x(x e X) -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y E z - -y e X)))" is true, then the
antecedent of this conditional will be false, and thus the conditional will be true.
But if we decide that "flX(3x(x E X) -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y Ex -+ -y E X)))" is false,
then the antecedent of this conditional will be true and its consequent false. To clearly see
this, observe that if a E {x : -HX( E X 3x(x E X A Vy(y E x -+ -y E X))) and
{xz : 4b()} is a class abstract that can be substituted for "X" to obtain a true substitution
instance of "- fX(a E•X -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y E r - -py E X)))," then, if b E a, the class
'
6 This problem is by no means specific to the language of classes, but rather it is a perfectly general
difficulty: whatever one's language, if one expects to make unambiguous use of substitutional quantification,
one should not allow for the occurrence of substitutional quantifiers within the substituted terms.
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abstract {x : q(x) vx = b} can be substituted by "X" to obtain a true substitution instance
of - ' X(b E X - 3x(x E X A Vy(y E•x -+ -y E X))). We conclude that the conditional is
false, and hence that "llX(3x(x E X) -+ 3x(x E X A Vy(y e•x --+ -y E X)))" is itself false.
Not surprisingly, then, though perfectly suited for the interpretation of predicative the-
ories of classes such as GB, the substitutional interpretation of the class quantifiers is no
alternative to the plural interpretation of impredicative theories of classes such as MK that
we have developed here.
3.5 Proper classes and set-theoretical practice
We have seen that the plural interpretation of impredicative theories of classes presents
us with a principled explanation of the set-class distinction that is compatible with the
universality of set theory as the most comprehensive theory or combinatorial collections,
when these are taken to be objects. But not only are plural interpretations of theories
of classes satisfactory as a principled explanation of the set-class distinction, they provide
us with the machinery necessary to carry out important developments in set theory. This
section will focus on just a few examples from contemporary set theory.
I remarked in the introduction that contemporary set theory is permeated with classes;
a variety of large cardinal principles are formulated in model-theoretic terms that are not
directly formalizable in the language of ZFC. What is perhaps the most prominent example
of a model-theoretic concept used in the formulation of large cardinal principles that requires
the machinery of proper classes for its formulation is that of an elementary embedding for
class structures. An elementary embedding of a class structure, Mo, into another, MI1, is
an injective map, j, from the domain of Mo, a proper class, into the domain of M 1, another
proper class, such that:
whenever 4(vl, ..., v,) is a formula of ZFC. j is called non-trivial if it is not the identity
map, in which case j(6) > 6 for some ordinal 6, its critical point. One reason for the un-
formalizability of the concept of elementary embedding for class structures in the language
of ZFC is that, by the Gidel-Tarski undefinability of truth argument, we have that neither
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the satisfaction relation for formulas of ZFC, Sat(rq6, (xo, ..., xn)) if V [• 4, nor the sat-
isfaction relation for formulas of ZFC for proper classes, Sat(r l, (xo, ..., xn, M)), can be
defined within ZFC. This is also the source of the strict unformalizability of assertions such
as "M is an inner model of ZFC," when M is a class structure, but it is not the principal
reason one can use to motivate the move to an impredicative theory of classes. For, after
all, a more economical solution to this problem would be to supplement the language of
ZFC with the addition of a satisfaction predicate implicitly defined by the usual recursive
definition. What is the principal impediment for the formalizability of large cardinal hy-
potheses asserting the existence of an elementary embedding, j, of the universe into some
inner model of ZFC arises from the inability of ZFC to assert the existence of a proper class,
the map j, which need not be definable as the range of some formula, b(x, y) of ZFC.
Despite both the strict unformalizability of the model-theoretic concept of elementary
embedding for class structures and the inability of ZFC to formalize existential assertions
of a proper class, set theorists have studied an entire hierarchy of large cardinal principles
that assert the existence of an elementary embedding of the universe of all sets into inner
models that satisfy different closure conditions. The first large cardinal principle of this sort
states the existence of a non-trivial elementary embedding of the universe of all sets, V, into
some inner model, a principle that is equivalent to the existence of a measurable cardinal.
Other large cardinal principles are the result of the imposition of additional conditions on
the inner model M above. The stronger the closure conditions imposed on M, the stronger
the corresponding large cardinal principle. For example, a cardinal Kx is y-strong iff there
is a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V -+ M, rK is the least ordinal moved by j and
7 < j(K), and V,+., C M. A cardinal n is strong iff it is strong for every 7. But K is
superstrong if there is a non-trivial elementary embedding j : V -+ M with critical point K
such that Vj(s) C M.
These cardinals are only the first stages of a hierarchy that has been intensely studied in
recent times. In the later stages of the hierarchy are the compact, supercompact, and huge
cardinals. For example, a cardinal is 7-supercompact iff it is the least ordinal moved by a
non-trivial elementary embedding j : V -+ M such that j(K) > 7 and M is closed under
7-sequences; a cardinal K is supercompact iff it is 7-supercompact for all 7 < K. There is
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an upper limit on the hierarchy, whose formulation is due to William Reinhardt: K is a
Reinhardt cardinal iff K is the least ordinal moved by a non-trivial elementary embedding
j : V -+ V. In 1971, Kenneth Kunen proved that there is no non-trivial elementary
embedding of the universe of all sets into itself, and hence that there are no such cardinals as
Reinhardt cardinals. Ever since Kunen proved his result, an important number of theorists
have concentrated their efforts in the examination of cardinals that seem as large as possible
but are nevertheless immune to Kunen's argument.
It is not uncommon for set theorists to take comfort in the fact that most of the large
cardinal principles I have mentioned admit of alternative characterizations that are formal-
izable in ZFC. For example, the existence of a non-trivial elementary embedding, j, of the
universe into some inner model is equivalent to the existence of a witnessing ultrafilter on
K, the least ordinal moved by j, which is of course formalizable in ZFC. Similarly, there
are alternative characterizations of supercompactness in terms of ultrapowers that are like-
wise formalizable in ZFC. This reaction is not entirely satisfactory. Except perhaps for the
principle that asserts the existence of a measurable cardinal, the intelligibility of the large
cardinal principles formulated in terms of the existence of elementary embeddings derives
from their model-theoretic characterization, and not from the set-theoretic characterizations
set theorists obtain a posteriori, after the theory of these principles is thoroughly developed.
Not only does the use of class-theoretic characterizations taps a vital source of intuitions
about these large cardinals, quite often, it is required to render arguments intelligible. This
fact alone makes it desirable to be able to develop the theory of large cardinals in a setting
in which it is possible to formalize the class-theoretic characterizations we have mentioned.
Furthermore, it would be hopeless to suppose that all the cardinal principles set theo-
rists entertain will at some point reveal themselves to be equivalent to assertions that are
formalizable in ZFC. For one example, Vope~nka's principle, i.e., the principle that, given a
proper class of structures for a language, there is one that is elementary embeddable into
another, is not formalizable in ZFC. I think we should admit, as a consequence, that ZFC
is definitely not the best setting for the development of the study of the large cardinal
principles mentioned thus far.
In practice, with perhaps a few exceptions, set theorists tend to develop the study of
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large cardinals within an informal theory of classes, and, then, after theory is developed, to
consider possible, more roundabout formalizations of all these developments in the context
of ZFC. The main purpose of the plural interpretation we have developed is to provide the
resources necessary to sustain a well-entrenched practice, the use of the theory of classes
in the study of large cardinals. One problem with the use of a theory of classes is that
what is perhaps the most common interpretation of the theory involves commitment to
set-like entities that are not sets. And this commitment is in tension with the universality
of set theory as the most comprehensive theory of combinatorial collections, as objects, and
makes the policy of disallowing proper classes to be members of other classes artificial. The
plural interpretation we have developed gives us what we want: an interpretation of Morse-
Kelley set theory that is compatible with the assumption that sets are all the combinatorial
collections, as objects, there are, and which nevertheless accounts for the fact that proper
classes cannot belong to other classes.
This interpretation makes sense of all the different model-theoretic concepts we want to
formalize as well as of all the different large cardinal hypotheses we have considered thus
far. Thus, for example, an inner model M is, on the plural interpretation developed here,
given by certain ordered pairs - the interpretation of the two-place predicate letter "E"
- satisfying certain conditions: every ordinal occurs as a component of one of them, and
all the axioms of ZFC are satisfied when interpreted with respect to the sets that occur as
a component of one of the pairs, provided that a formula "x E y" is interpreted as true
relative to an assignment iff the set assigned to "x" appears as the first component of an
ordered pair whose second component is the set assigned to "y." Similarly, the existence of
an elementary embedding j of the universe of all sets into some inner model amounts, on
the plural interpretation presented here, to the existence of certain ordered pairs satisfying
the usual conditions.
Another context in which classes take center stage involves the use of certain reflection
principles. Most set theorists who have written on axioms of infinity and the structure
of the set-theoretic universe regard it as plausible to suppose that V, the universe of all
(pure) sets, is structurally undefinable, and thus that no structural property of V fails to
be reflected lower down in some level V/ of the cumulative hierarchy of sets. For example,
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since On is undoubtedly strongly inaccessible - if A is an ordinal, then 20 is an ordinal, and
the limit of arbitrary sequences of ordinals of length < On is certainly an ordinal, therefore
there must be a level of the cumulative hierarchy, V, with K strongly inaccessible. But then,
since On is strongly inaccessible but > K for a strong inaccessible K, there must be another
inaccessible, etc. Reflection is the main heuristic advanced for various large cardinals, but
it should be evident that it is not formalizable in the language of ZFC.' 7 Once again, the
interest of the plural interpretation of the theory of classes is that it permits us to take
such reflection arguments seriously, for, even if we admit that there are no such objects
as proper classes, the plural number provides us with an interpretation of the language of
classes on which it is perfectly coherent and intelligible to talk about structural properties
of On or V. Thus, the assertion that On is strongly inaccessible is just the assertion that
the ordinals enjoy certain closure properties: if A is an ordinal, 2A is an ordinal, too, and
the limit of sequences of ordinals that are isomorphic to some ordinal is itself an ordinal.
There is a different, but complementary approach "from below" to the study of the
structure of the cumulative hierarchy in which proper classes are supposed to play an
important role, too. This is an approach that is motivated by the view, that set theory can
be taken as a formal extension of known facts in finite set theory into the transfinite. Harvey
Friedman has partially developed this approach in "Transfer Principles in Set Theory."' 8 A
transfer principle is an assertion to the effect that a certain fact of finite set theory can be
generalized into the transfinite. In particular, Friedman has explored connections between
functions on w and functions on the entire class of ordinals, On to isolate plausible transfer
principles of the form:
If for all suitable functions fl., fp, from Nk - N, A(fl, ..., fp), then for all
suitable functions fi, ..., f, from Onk -+ On, A(f 1J, ..., fp),
for appropriate existential sentences A(fI, ..., fp).
"To the limited extent to which reflection is formalized in first-order ZFC as the principle:
Vao9 > arVzr,..., V,, e V (#(si, ..., 2,) a @v,(z a, ..., z,))
it is a theorem of ZFC.
'sCf. (Friedman, 1997).
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The first point to be noticed is that no instance of this schema can be formalized in the
language of ZFC, as its consequent states that a certain fact about arbitrary functions on
On obtains. The interest of these transfer principles is that they provide us with information
concerning both the width and the depth of the cumulative hierarchy, as some of them are
equivalent with large cardinal principles that contradict the axiom of constructibility, i.e.,
V = L. In particular, Friedman has proved that different transfer principles are equivalent
to different hypotheses concerning structural properties of On, such as the hypotheses that
On is weakly compact, or ineffable, or Ramsey.
For present purposes, however, the interest of this development is that, again, it would
seem to require for its intelligibility an adequate interpretation of the theory of classes, as
none of the class-theoretic hypothesis concerning On is provably equivalent to a purely set-
theoretic sentence. And I think that the plural interpretation of the Morse-Kelley theory
provides us with what we want.
3.6 Conclusion
To summarize, then, we have argued that plurals provide us with interpretations of several
theories that encompass sets and classes, which are not subject to the difficulties faced by
rival accounts of the set-class distinction. In particular, I have suggested that the identifica-
tion of classes with collections, in Richard Cartwright's sense, has a number of advantages
over other, more traditional accounts of the distinction. One important advantage of the
present account is that it draws a principled distinction between sets and classes, and not
one based merely on size or location in the cumulative hierarchy. Plural quantification
enables us to simulate "logical collections" as collections that divide the universe into two
categories depending on whether objects are one of them or not, and it does so in a way in
which the connection between sets and logical collections, or classes, is perfectly clear: set
theory is concerned with all the sets - indeed all the set-like entities there are, and classes
are simply collections of those entities.
Another advantage of the proposal is that it provides a rationale for the policy of dis-
allowing proper classes to bear the element-class relation to other classes. That classes, in
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general, cannot bear the element-set relation to other classes is clear, since the element-set
relation takes only singular arguments. But it should be equally clear that the first arglu-
ment of the element-class relation, "is one of," is unmistakably singular, and hence that it
can never be occupied by a class. We conclude that the requirement that classes don't bear
the element-class relation to other classes is a principled one, when one conceives of classes
as collections, in Richard Cartwright's sense. I should note, however, that this observation
leaves open the possibility that there be a relation of the form "are some of them" whose
last argument is doubly plural: it takes collections of collections of sets. Then, as Russell
once put it, "a class oi classes [would be] many many's; its constituents [would] each be
many, and [could] not therefore in any sense be single constituents." (Russell, 1903, p.
516). Whether this is so much as an intelligible view is, however, a question that I shall not
address here.
At all events, what is perhaps the most important advantage of the approach we have
advocated is that it permits us to embrace the theory of classes without commitment to
set-like entities other than sets, and hence without threatening the universality of set the-
ory. As a result, on the plural interpretation we have developed here, Morse-Kelley set
theory provides us with the machinery necessary to carry out important developments in
contemporary set theory.
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